| The company’s capital structure theory is that reasonable financing can help companies realize the maximum value and increase the corporate interests of the shareholders. The capital structure of the enterprise includes the broad capital structure and the narrow capital structure. The generalized capital structure includes the ratio of equity and bond financing, debt proportion of internal financing and the allocation ratio of shares, while the narrow capital structure only refers to the allocation ratio between the company’s equity and debt. Existing research about the company’s capital structure mostly confines to the narrow sense of the company’s capital structure, but not many studies on the broader capital structure. These studies are mostly built under the assumption that the kind of enterprises’ debt is homogeneous, there is no concerned about the distinction of company’s debt.From the view of the real market environment, the types of liabilities of the company are different; the biggest difference is the maturity structure of debt. In the process of financing, the ratio of long-term debt matches short-term debt, taking full advantage of long-term debt or short-term debt does not exist. In the study of the different existence of the company s debt financing, there were four contract theories:cost theory, tax theory, signaling theory, duration matching theory.This paper is divided into four main parts. The first part is an introduction, mainly explains the background, purpose and significance of this research.The second part is the overview of literature and theory.The third part is empirical. In this section, based on the existing debt maturity structure theory and our current market situation analysis, we put forward assumptions of this article and select the listed companies’ data in2006-2009from the CSMAR, then select the proportion of long-term debt as explanatory variables to study Shareholding structure and executive stock ownership. Paper establishes the three groups’ model regression analysis. We can get the following conclusions from the model regression:in the case of debt financing market information asymmetry, The company’s management about the choice of debt maturity structure is not in accordance with the signal of theory and the company’s management defense effect exists in the choice of debt maturity, the effect of this defense will rise with the rise of the stake of the largest shareholder equity and equity checks and balances on the choice of the maturity structure of debt management cannot produce supervision effects. This paper argues that this phenomenon mainly due to the following reason:Firstly, now the Chinese management stake of listed companies is low, so the choice of management in its debt is not able to comply with the signal transmission theory. Secondly, the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder on the one hand can increase the company’s long-term debt guaranteed effectiveness, on the other hand, the external investors seem to provide more effective oversight of management, therefore, the company with the high concentration of ownership, the proportion of long-term debt will rise. Thirdly, ownership balancing weakens the enthusiasm of the largest shareholder of regulatory and the capacity of shareholder guarantees, therefore, management will reduce the company’s long-term debt.The fourth part of this paper put forward policy recommendations according to the empirical results of the third part on the management equity incentive and the rational allocation of equity.The inadequacies of this article are:firstly, because of the less relevant literature, the choice of the variables of the model cannot analyze the contrast relation of the related variable. Secondly, due to the weighted average debt maturity structure data cannot be selected, this study can only choose the proportion of long-term debt analysis, that may have led to a certain amount of deviation between research result and the actual existence. |
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