| Since the reform and opening up, the rapid development of China’s private economy is becoming more and more important in the national economy, the proportion of GDP is60%or more, in recent years, private companies started to speed up the pace to list, as of the end of2010, the Shanghai and Shenzhen two listed private enterprises has about1000, become China’s securities market main force on. In this context, the research on the private enterprise ownership structure and corporate governance of China’s listed company governance for the development of the securities market has important theoretical and practical significance.Careful examination of Chinese private listed companies’ultimate ownership structure can be found, the pyramidal structure in private listed companies in China is very common, in the ownership structure, the core issue of corporate governance has been from the shareholders--management agency conflict into the controlling shareholder--the agency conflict between small shareholders. The controlling shareholders can use their control power obtained from the company interests, caused the harm to the interests of small shareholders, because of our imperfect corporate governance structure, small investor rights protection mechanism is not sound, the ultimate controller’s control of the company are secret and the complexity, the listed company appeared a lot of tunneling" phenomenon caused the wide attention of the society.But from private company listed on the way, there are direct listing and merger&reorganization, direct listing private enterprise leader is the founder of the company, who has a wealthy entrepreneur spirit, a lot of enterprises before going on the market has grown into the outstanding enterprises, the purpose to listing is to use this platform to realize capital market financing and build the brand’s, the largest purpose to holding shares is long-term and stable operation of enterprises. The incentive effect from entrepreneur spirit leads to good corporate governance. At the same time, due to our country’s current economic system, the financing of the private enterprises is relatively difficult, the company even established Pyramid shareholding structure is to make full use of middle retained earnings of the company and the listed company’s financing ability to develop business, the separation of ownership and control right is not its main purpose, whether will tunneling as a Pyramid structure the extensive reason still need further proof."No significant control in the ownership and no significant ownership in control rights" has become the core problem to be solved in corporate governance, the later researchers mainly focus on the research of control right. But obviously, in the principal-agent, if not play agent initiative as well as in the knight sense of risk and uncertainty of the entrepreneurial spirit, to the enterprise control power control mechanism may be of no significance. It is in this sense; we must put the focus of corporate governance from control right transferred to the ultimate controller’s motivation and behavior. This study will be transferred to the ultimate controller view of its own characteristics, analysis of ultimate control person’s characteristics caused by the differences in motivational differences and behavior choices on the impact of the company.The empirical analysis in this paper shows that, the characteristics of ultimate controller and the market degree to company value has a significant effect, Pyramid structure can be used for low cost access control right of listed companies, and then" tunneling", may also be used to provide internal financing, which is a neutral control mode.Finally, in the empirical research, this paper also on the Pyramid structure of private listed company supervision and protection of small shareholders and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. At the same time, the paper points out the deficiency of research and limitations, and directions for further research in this field. |
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