Chinese Government’s Investment Behavior And The Study Of Problems

The first part of this paper is the introduction. The second part summarizes therelated theories of government investment. Under these theories, in the world thereare various forms of government investment, so we should summarize the relatedtheories that can instruct the later context. Between classical economics toneoclassical economics, between Keynesian economics to new Keynesian economics,this paper will analyze the same and the difference of the government’s role and therelationships in every school of thoughts.The third part of this paper will answer the movie of the government investment,but we should restraint the movie. And the government should follow some principles.The most important movie to the government investment behavior is the personalprofit maximization, at least the second best of the personal profit. Except thepersonal profit maximization, the government will think about other economic factors.Other non-economic factors and so on. When the government pursues the personalprofit and the public profit, there are a series of supervision and restriction. Also thereis a border of the government investment: the source scarcity restriction, the cost andprofit restriction and so on. Also, the government should follow some principles: thecombination principle of the economic profit and the politic profit. The combinationprinciple of the microcosmic profit and the macrocosmic profit. The combinationprinciple of the fair and the efficiency.From the fourth part of the paper, I give the problems of the Chinese governmentinvestment. At first, this part write that the government investment bring us somepositive effect. But, the government investment also brings up some negative effect.The problems of Chinese government investment are that: impulsive investment,cut-throat competition, repetitive structure, change as one likes, short-term investment,and so on.In the fifth part, I analyze the problems of Chinese government investmentbehavior. The evaluation of political achievement has too relied on the economictarget. The government officials are responsible for the higher government not thenational people’s congress and the public. The system design of the revenue hasdefect. At last, I analyze from the game theory: because of the unreasonableencourage system, prisoner’s dilemma has been appeared between the lower governments. Also, because of the lower cost of the punishment and the higher cost ofthe supervision, there exist the higher government’s no-behavior and the lowergovernment’s illegal investment behavior.The sixth part, on the ground of the fourth part, I suggest the advice to solve thegovernment investment problems. Raise the proportion of the people’s livelihood inthe evaluation of political achievement. Establish the lateral chain of the agency byagreement, that is: the National People’s Congress should supervise the same levelgovernment more vigorous than before. Perfect the revenue system design. Perfect theinspiration and restriction system.