An Study On The Impact Of Institutional Investor Holding On Information Disclosure Quality Of Listed Companies

The information disclosed by the listed companies can reflect the company’s operating status, operating results and its future development, which is an important basis for investors to understand and study the listed companies and make investment decisions. Thus high-quality disclosure can mitigate the "information asymmetry" between listed companies and investors, then be more conducive to reduce agency costs between management layers and investors, small investors and large shareholders, in turn, if the information disclosure is not true, not timely, not standardized, incomplete and so on, it will do significant harm to the interests of investors, and reduce the efficiency of the capital market allocation of resources.Since the strategy of "unconventional development of institutional investors" by China Securities Regulatory Commission in2001, both the number and the size of institutional investors have been on a fast-growing way, and now the institutional investors has become an important force in the securities market. Under this situation, the influence of share-holdings of institutional investors, especially, different types of institutional investors holding on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, has become the mutual interest of theory and practice communities. This paper has discussed the issue from both theoretical and empirical respective.So, after the review of domestic and foreign scholars’research, and consideration of actual conditions in China, the writer sorts out and analyzes the relevant theories. First discusses the motivation of institutional investors to affect the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, from the point of reducing the principal-agency costs and the incentives of the information disclosure size. Then the writer analyzes the mechanism of institutional investors exerting on information disclosure, from both the internal channels and external channels.In the empirical analysis, in order to control " endogeny " that may exist, this paper selects the evaluation results of listed companies from2008to2010by Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the dependent variable, whether the institutional investors have share-holdings or not or the proportion of shares in T-1period as the independent variable, and the proportion of independent directors, debt ratio and other indicators in T-1period as control variables. Then the writer use panel data model for data processing, and make contrast with the mixed regression results to test the robustness. The results show that the overall institutional investor holdings or not, and the overall proportion of institutional investors holding have significant positive impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies; but the subdivision of different types of institutional investors finds that only the social security funds and securities fund hold shares or not, have significant positive influence on the quality of listed companies’ information disclosure, while the security companies, trust companies, insurance companies and qualified Foreign Institutional investor (QFII) which is widely anticipated by the regulators, otherwise, not. In addition, among the control variables, company size and ownership concentration positively influence the information disclosure, while the effect of asset-liability ratio is negative, at the same time, the influence of net return on assets and the proportion of independent directors is not significant.In the end, according to the research results and the actual situation in China’s capital market, this article proposes targeted recommendations and countermeasures.