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Food Safety Stakeholder’s Behavioral Analysis On The Basis Of Game Theory

Posted on:2013-05-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ShangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330371992069Subject:Political economy
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Food safety is not a new topic as many scholars have researches on this question, which is because of the importance of food safety. Recently, there are a number of food safety problems which show new characteristics, such as conspiracy between regulators and unscrupulous manufacturers, so this paper does some researches and analysis on the topic again.From the angle of economics, all individuals are selfish and rational, the parties related with food safety is the same. This article does not only analyze the food safety problem with the economical methods, but focus on how the parties related with food safety make their behavioral decision on the basis of game theory, and searches for solutions to food safety problems. By the game analysis between manufacturers and regulators, it is found that enhancing the information transparency can increase the cost of producing unsafe food, aggravating the regulatory punishment can improve regulatory supervision efficiency. The dynamic game between them reveals that food producers will probably produce unsafe food if they know regulators are likely out of their duties. It can be concluded that food safety will be enhanced under a stricter regulatory environment. The game analysis between food producers is similar to the model of prisoner’s dilemma. It shows that once one food producer makes profit through producing unsafe food, the entire industry is going to reduce food quality to win the market. And the game between middleman and manufacturers shows results from short-term game and long-term game are different. If all the participants concern with long-term profit, they will take the initiative to improve food safety. The dynamic game among producers, consumers and regulators gives out a very good description of the fact that consumer is also an important part in the food supervision. If each consumer can uphold justice, food manufacturers dare not to produce unsafe food, even they do they will not produce in large-scale. But as a result of hitchhike, victim consumers will not uphold justice alone unless it is easy enough for them to do it or they will get prize for it. If they do not stick to justice, it is going to increase the difficulty of regulatory authorities, and also prompt more food producers continuously ignore the issue of food safety.In addition, when it comes to the famous issue of Sanlu milk, this paper does game analysis with some particular data which may not be so accurate, and explain the reason why Sanlu milk was unsafe and why the exposure of truth delays.There are a lot of researches about food safety problem, and various policy suggestions are given. While this paper just tries to use the basic method of game theory to analyze main parties’ behavior, and give out solutions orderly. It is hoped that relevant departments can take policy recommendations into practice, so that Chinese people can eat everything at ease.
Keywords/Search Tags:game theory, the food safety, analysis of main parties’ behavior
PDF Full Text Request
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