Research On Team Reasoning Based On Behavior Experiment

In recent years, with the rapid development of Behavioral Economics andExperimental Economics, economists found by experiment: the participants in theexperiment not only concerned with personal interests, but also concerned with theinterests of others or the interests of the collective in which the participants are.Research on the individual non-self-interest has aroused the attention of experts.TR is the research on individual choosing collective rationality which is a kindof the individual non-self-interest. In this paper, the theme is TR, and there is a seriesof related research on the existence of TR, model modified, assumptions of TR andthe scope of its’ application through theoretical study and experimental design.Firstly, the advantages and disadvantages of existing theories are summarizedthrough researching on related theory. The relatively complete concept of TR is putforward, and compared with the related theory in order to find out the differencebetween them and to prove the non-substitutability of TR, at the same time, TR’sassumptions.Secondly, the advantages and disadvantages of existing TR’s models aresummarized according to the difference between TR’s models and other models. Themodel is modified including external signal factor especially the degree of confidencebased on Bacharach’s model.Thirdly, there are five experiments, the purpose of which is to prove theexistence and the assumptions of TR, and to find out the applicable scope for TRthrough the process of experiments in this paper. The results of experiments not onlyprove the existence of TR, whose effect on players is obvious, but also prove thatindividual rationality and collective rationality coexist at the same time, the playersidentify himself with a group with a common values when he choose collectiverationality and they believe the others will choose the same as himself in thecondition of information asymmetry.Based on the design, process and result analysis of experiments, the applicable scope for TR, which is achieved, is that there are some explicit and implicitconditions to make players choose collective rationality，the same direction betweenindividual interests and collective interests will enhance TR’s effect, or will restrain,and there is only a solution, or it will make the TR unstable.Finally, the analysis of TR based on the data of experiments, is mainly about therelationship between the number of solution and the stability of TR. Demonstration isprovided to prove the non-substitutability of TR with mathematical method.