Security Of Wireless Communication Based On Game Theory

The thriving development of wireless channels poses both benefits and penalties for securecommunication. But because of special properties transmitted signal is extremely prone to beeavesdropped or attacked by inlegal terminals. Since there are many kinds of different interests’conflict and cooperation relationship between every terminal in wireless network, and game theoryis good at handling these relationships, therefore it is profoundly meaningful to studying wirelesscommunication based on security using game theory.First of all, two-way relay network composed of two sources, two-way relay and jammer isstudied in this thesis.In this network, relay is also an eavesdropper, its objective is to decrese securerate while two sourses is to maximize secure rate with the help of the jammer by jamming therelay.The jammer charges the sources according to quantity and price of jamming power. Hence abuyer and seller relationship is formed between source and jammer. The thesis uses Stackelberg tosolve this problem and prove the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. Simulationsshow that the optical value of power quantity sources buyed decreases when price increase andprove the effectiveness of the relay.In addition, game relationship between jammer relay and source in the network with source,destination, jammer relay and eavesdropper is studied. In the network, jammer relay chooses beingpure relay or/and sending Gassian noise to help eavesdropper. Since source wants to increase securerate, so an adversarial relationship between source and relay is formed. The thesis uses zero-sumgame to solve the problem, gets payoff of both players and proves the existence of equilibrium.Simulations show that using both pure relaying and sending Gassian noise can decrease secure rateeffectively, and equilibrium exists when jammer relay only sending Gassian noise.Finally, game relationship between jammer relay and source is studied when jammer relaychooses being pure relay or/and sending structured codewords. The thesis uses zero-sum game tosolve the problem, gets payoff of both players and proves the existence of equilibrium. Simulationsshow that using both pure relaying and sending structured codewords can decrease secure rateeffectively, equilibrium exists when jammer relay is being pure relay, and the secure rate whensending structured codeword is smaller than or equal to the value when sending Gaussian noise.