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Research On Primary User Emulation Attack And Countermeasures With Mobile Secondary Users In Cognitive Radio Networks

Posted on:2014-02-06Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F J BaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2248330395473753Subject:Electronic and communication engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Low resource utilization for traditional fixed spectrum assignment policy has led to the problem of increasingly scarce spectrum resources. As we know, cognitive radio can release the problem via opportunistic spectrum sharing using dynamic spectrum access. In a cognitive radio network, the license holders, named as the primary users, have the priority to use the spectrum bands; others, named as the secondary users, can access the spectrum bands that are vacant. If secondary users sense that the primary user reclaims the assigned channel, they need to vacate the spectrum resource timely without interfering with the primary user. Because of this, the cognitive radio networks may face primary user emulation attack (PUEA), a great potential denial-of-service attack. In order to build a secure cognitive radio network, effective defense strategies of the PUEA are necessary. Primary user emulation attack and countermeasures with mobile secondary users in cognitive radio network are researched in this paper.We proposed a hybrid PUEA defense strategy based on energy detection and variance detection to defend the PUEA in cognitive radio networks with mobile secondary users. The main assessment criterions of the strategy are probability of false positive and probability of false negative of the proposed hypothesis test. With the hybrid defense stratefy, the defender can switch the PUEA detection method with the variance of distance between the attack and defender. Our proposed hybrid PUEA defense strategy can defense attacks successfully with higher probability and lower resources consumption.We analyze the PUEA problem in cognitive radio networks with mobile secondary users within a Bayesian game framework. In the game, the attacker and defender endeavor to maximize their self-interest; a policy maker will treat justice and the overall performance. Analyzing equilibrium of the Bayesian game, we show that a policy maker can control the justice and the overall performance of the cognitive radio network by adjusting the punishment to the users who break the rule.
Keywords/Search Tags:Cognitive radio network, Mobile, Dynamic spectrum access, Primary useremulation attack, Game theory, Nash equilibrium
PDF Full Text Request
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