Game Of Power And The Interest Expression Of Peasants’group

Game of Power and the Interest Expression of Peasants’Group: A case study of J Village in southwestern part of Shandong province30years of reform and opening up, China’s rural society had been through a profound restructuring due to the market-oriented, urbanization and commercialization. In rural areas, the differentials of social groups are growing, social differences between stakeholders gradually.widening; peasants’sense of social deprivation is worsening, event like violation of peasantries interests is repeating. In the context of transition, the peasants’interest demands continue to stand out and based on these demands, the interests expression of peasants’group has become a virtual social fact in today’s rural grass-rooted society. Due to the limitations of existing political system, the expression of the form of interest by routine administrative or judicial relief system can not meet the needs of the demand of peasants’interests, therefore, the realistic of the interest expression of peasants’ groups, which known as social fact, shows a unique logic of practice.Current academic research about the interests expression of peasants’group is mainly focused on two aspects, which are mechanism and action strategies, and these two respects leads to two research paths. For mechanism of the interests expression of peasants’group, some of the scholars, based on the theory of state power construction, analyze the institutional defects and structural barriers of grassroots political power from structure-institutional level. It is the structural and institutional deficiencies constitute a mechanism of the interests expression of peasantry groups. Simultaneously, due to the different understanding of the institutional defects and structural barriers of grassroots political power, scholars debate over the strength of the current grassroots national political power. For action strategies of the interests expression of peasants’group, most of the scholars, based on the subaltern studies theory, analyze peasants’action strategies and independent actions space by the degree of peasants’organizations and its action intensity. Scholars also have a debate over the strength of peasants’group power based on the degree of peasantries’ organizations and its action intensity.The two theories analyze the interests expression of peasants’group under transition period from macro institutional aspect and micro action strategies aspect. However, there are some problems exist:both theories follow the theoretical framework of the "State-Civil Society", the two often paranoid at their own belief. Theory of state power construction, based on the different understanding of the institutional defects and structural barriers of grassroots political power, emphasis more on the strength of the state power, while subaltern studies theory, on the other hand, emphasis more on the strength of the social forces based on the different perceptions of the degree of peasants’organizations and its action intensity. Yet, both theories show a reductionism tendency and ignored the complex relationships of the various forces in the reality of rural society. This essay attempts to go beyond the dualistic way of thinking of country-society. By introducing the filed theory and using it analyzing the relations between game and powers among national grassroots political power, community authority and the peasants’group, this paper believes that the strengths of the grassroots political power and the strengths of the peasants’group is not static in rural social space, but relative, and it has no strict power boundary. The strength of different powers in grassroots society mostly depends on the game and contrast of the forces.Therefore, the core opinion of this paper is:the game and contrast of different forces in rural society is the dynamic mechanism of the interests expression of peasants’group. It is also the main reason influencing and restricting peasantries choosing different interests expressions in specific situation and, simultaneously, the peasants’interest demands are achieved under the game equilibrium of various structural forces.In order to illustrate this opinion in detail, the author will take a village disputes in the south west part of Shandong Province as an example and analyze specifically how peasantry groups, in the J village filed, operate a variety form of capital and resources to enhance their own power to change the power relationships contrast to realize their own interest demands by analyzing the game of peasantry groups, grassroots state power and community authority forces, the dynamic mechanism of the expression of peasantries group’s interests and action strategies adopted by peasantries under the pressure of the various forces. According to the theoretical thinking and empirical data, here below listed the conclusion of this paper:1.There is an essentially difference between the interests expression of peasants’ group and the peasantry events. In order to realize the personal interest demands, peasantries will adopt extremely rational mode of action to express their wills under the scope of law or policy permits or does not explicitly prohibit. Therefore, unlike peasantry events, the expression of peasantries group’s interests has its unique action logic.2.The dynamic mechanism of the expression of peasantries group’s interests. The expression is under the combined effects of the external environment (relatively open political space and the free flow of resources), potential power (pattern of interests’ imbalance) and core power (capital operation). Under the context of the transition, there is a relatively open political space and free flow of resources in rural society which despite the imbalance in the pattern of material interests, it can not directly leads to the actions of the expression of peasantries group’s interests. The imbalance in the pattern of interests exists just as a potential factor of the expression of interests. In village field, the force increment, due to the structural forces game and the expression of peasantries group’s interests based on the capital mobilization, is the core power of the interests of the expression of the action.3.The logic of rational action and capital operation strategy of the peasantries. Adversely affect the interests, peasantries, based on the measure of the strengths and weakness of potential, will take extremely rational logic of action. They will neither take risk with extreme mass incidents, nor will they adopt the action which is called "weapon of the weak" on the Scott significant like steal and rape, escape or private revenge. In the real village field, Chinese peasantries realize their personal demands of interests in the force game by adopting extremely rational action strategy like "manage" various capitals and resources. They developed a series of "mode of operation" which includes capital transformation strategy, legalization strategy and the capital of mutually reinforcing strategy.4.The expediency logical of the interests expression of peasants’groups. This paper believes that in the village field, in order to achieve interest demands, peasantries will adopt expedient action logic under a rational plan. Petitions, demonstrations, class actions or peasantries cooperation, all of which is an instrumental mean to achieve interest balance. In the reality, peasantries is not confined to the mode of any actions of petitions, demonstrations and litigations, on the contrary, according to the power relation contrast, they operate the above resources interactively. It totally illustrates the generating characteristics of power relations in the village field. 5.The peasants’interest demands are achieved under the game equilibrium of various structural forces. Under rational and expedient action logic, the expression of peasantries group’s interests use capital transformation strategy, legalization strategy and the capital of mutually reinforcing strategy combined with the using of expediency action logic specifically and interaction between the law of political capital and social capital within and outside of the village field achieved a growth of structural forces and the increase of social influence and reached equilibrium with grassroots political power, rural authority, in the power game. This leads to two results: one is the collapse of the grassroots political power and the original rural authority which for the government, the original rural interests can no longer act as its agent; the other is that due to the consideration of the political achievements and stability, grassroots government can not ignore the interest demands of peasantries in J village any more but to cooperate with them.