Legal Regulation Of The Listed Company’s Executive Compensation

Listed companies are an advanced form of modern companies, the trend of moderndevelopment in the modern enterprise, the company’s ownership and management of phaseseparation. Executives with the company’s management control, it is essential for thedevelopment of the company. Therefore, good system of remuneration for executives of listedcompanies has greater incentive and restraint. After two decades of development, China’scapital market continues to grow and become an important part of the national economicsystem. But executives of listed companies in China pay many problems still exist.Executives of listed companies in China pay excessive growth of an endless stream ofastronomical salaries and executive compensation to company performance low correlation orno correlation, and these have aroused strong dissatisfaction. Therefore, to improve the legalregulation of executive pay in listed companies in China urgently need to be resolved.Explained through the concept of logical reasoning and comparative analysis methods,the range of issues relating to legal regulation executives of listed companies pay morein-depth study, in which a number of recommendations of the legal regulatory focus onexecutive pay in listed companies. Legal Regulation of the legal system in order to executivepay in China’s listed company to help. This thesis is divided into six parts, a total of about26,000words.The first part is mainly to define and explain the legal regulation related to the concept ofthe listed company’s executive compensation. Introduce the concept of listed companies, theconcept of the executives and the concept of remuneration in order to have an overallawareness of the study subjects.The second part introduces the theories of the legal regulation of remuneration ofexecutives of listed companies to learn from. Mainly introduces the principal-agent theory,incentive theory, human capital theory. Provide theoretical support for the regulation ofexecutive pay in listed companies. Also provide the appropriate theoretical basis for the textof the study.The third part introduces the executives of listed companies in China with regard toremuneration the problems, mainly related to executive pay is too high, excessive growth ofinter-industry, inter-regional executives obviously pay differentials, executive compensation decision mechanism for decision-making process is imperfect, executive compensationincentive system is unreasonable, the executive compensation information disclosure systemis imperfect; and analysis of the proposed related problems, mainly due to: the generalmeeting of shareholders empty, the system is imperfect, of the Board, the Board ofSupervisors weak property right subject virtual home, government oversight but for theimproper administrative measures.The fourth part is the introduction of foreign advanced experience. This section firstintroduces the excellent experience of the executives of listed companies pay legal regulation,decision mechanism of a U.S. public company executive compensation, the remunerationsystem of information disclosure mechanism as well as shareholder derivative litigation. Weuse the contrast in the second part describes the regulatory experience of the developedWestern countries, representatives of Britain, France, Germany, divided into specific: theremuneration of the decision mechanism and salary information disclosure mechanism andthe monitoring mechanism.Part V introduced in front of the advanced experience of the United States and otherdeveloped countries in the listed company executive compensation regulation and analysis ofexecutive compensation status quo on the basis of the author of a number of recommendationson the legal regulation of the executives of listed companies in China pay. That part of themain contents include: to improve the executive compensation decision-making mechanismsand procedures to reconstruct the incentive pay system, improve the supervision mechanismof the executive compensation, and improve the information disclosure system and improvethe shareholder derivative litigation.Part VI is the conclusion of this thesis. Regulation of executive pay in listed companiesin China to practice level in just two decades, in practice there are related issues is inevitable.China should learn from the lessons learned at home and abroad, based on the actual buildand improve relevant laws and regulatory measures of executive compensation in listedcompanies in China, to safeguard the interests of the Company and its shareholders, and topromote the healthy development of China’s capital market.