Voting Procedures Of IGOs

Descriptive works have been abundant in the study of IGO voting procedures, and mostly were focusing themselves on one or more specific IGO(s), however, the exploration of universal rules, most of the time, were relatively ignored. This dissertation will follow a different approach that trying to explain what variables shaped them.An introduction will be given with the explanation of subject-selection, study background, and the approach this dissertation follows. And in first chapter, voting procedures are categorized according two criteria, the distribution of votes and the decision rules. While in the second chapter, issue scope, membership size, power configuration, democratic density, and path dependence will be discussed; and their respective influences on voting procedures will be studied. Why these five are chosen, each part will give its own reasons. Six hypotheses are initiated and demonstrated, and they will be synthesized with a table, with the aim of unfolding the mechanisms that give births to voting procedures. Chapter3selects the Council of European Union as an example to testify the hypotheses listed before.This dissertation considers that, distribution of votes is almost totally decided by issue scope; however, in low-politics IGOs, the configuration of power also exerts its influences. While the decision rules, are inclined to be unanimity when issue scope majorly covers high politics, or membership sizes stay tiny, or hold a bipolar structure, as well as with low democratic densities; when these factors go ahead the opposite directions, things will also be adversary.