An Empirical Study On The Configuration Of Local Financial Supervisory Power

Local finance has gradually become an important part of the financial market,and while it contributes to economic development,the problems of local financial regulation have gradually come to the fore.Local financial organisations operate in an unregulated manner,illegal finance is frequent,and the existing power configuration of regulators is not yet fully adapted to the regulatory challenges they pose,facing real dilemmas such as imperfect regulatory legislation,uncoordinated regulatory power configuration and insufficient regulatory capacity.The structure of this paper consists of four parts.The first part is the introduction.On the basis of introducing the background of this paper’s research,a typical case is used to raise the issue of how local financial regulatory powers are configured.Then,by combing through the literature related to the allocation of local financial regulatory power and on the basis of its review,the theoretical value and practical significance of this study are explained,and the research methods and research ideas adopted in this paper are introduced.Finally,the main sources of the research data in this paper are introduced.The second part is an interpretation of the legislation on the allocation of local financial regulatory powers.The central government and Sichuan Province’s legislation on local financial supervision is used as a reference to sort out the provisions of the existing system on local financial supervisory bodies and the configuration of their powers.Local financial regulatory powers can be divided into three categories: the power to approve,the power to supervise on a day-to-day basis and the power to deal with violations.There are significant differences in the allocation of powers between regulators at different levels,with statutory regulatory powers mostly concentrated in the hands of provincial regulators,while the powers of municipal and county-level regulators focus on day-to-day regulatory powers.The third part is an empirical examination of the allocation of local financial regulatory powers,with Sichuan Province as the target.The empirical investigation of this paper takes the promulgation of the Regulations on Local Financial Supervision and Management in Sichuan Province in 2019 until 2022 as the time point,and conducts field research and interviews with the local financial supervision bureaus in Sichuan Province,as well as the supervisory bodies of five prefecture-level cities and ten county-level cities and 16 local financial organisations,in order to obtain information and data on the actual allocation of local financial supervisory powers.The fourth part is a summary of the dilemmas in the allocation of local financial regulatory powers and its corresponding suggestions for improvement.Through the comparison of the differences between the legislative and actual allocation of local financial regulatory powers in the first two chapters,it is found that the laws on the allocation of local financial regulatory powers are imperfect,the allocation of the powers of regulators and even local financial regulation has such realistic dilemmas as the unreasonable setting of regulators,the lack of a complete operating mechanism for approval powers,the lack of supporting resources for daily supervision powers and the unbalanced allocation of illegal disposal powers.