Civil Servant Accountability Of Moral And Risk Reduction

The information asymmetry theory is the core of the modern information economics. The main point of this theory is that in social activities, the information which all kinds of involved people grasped is different. That’s to say, some participants have some information which others without. The information asymmetric phenomenon was firstly put forward by Kennethc·Joseph·Arrow in1963. Adverse selection, agent problem and moral hazard are three issues involved in it. From the angle of civil servants, the agent and service provider are in advantageous position, while the client and service acceptor are in disadvantageous position. In the client-agent relationship between civil servants and the publics, due to the rights ownership and usufruct, civil servants have their unique superiority to nearly monopolize the agent information, which causes bilateral information asymmetry. Based on this theory, the thesis aims to analyze the moral hazard and its mitigation problem during the course of civil servants duties.Moral hazard means "People engaged in economic activities making their greatest efforts to expand their own interests, in the meantime, doing harm to others." In other words, it is a selfish behavior to maximize their own effectiveness made by signatory who don’t need to take all consequences. For civil servants, moral hazard refers to actions violating social morality. And the motivation also comes from their maximized self benefits, thanks to their public rights.In the fulfillment of civil servants duties, the moral hazard is different from the business behavior. So it is quite difficult to reduce it. Differences of this moral hazard in the civil servant function can be with more complicated motivation, more covert means, more severe degree and even more profound impact ion.There are three types of moral hazard performed in civil servants fulfillment:negative nonfeasance, active but improper feasance and actively improper feasance.For one thing, from the view of objective chance, moral hazard in civil servants fulfillment first comes from some objective obstacles. For instance, there existing highly difficulties in some administrative work as well as some parts of its process. Meanwhile, there are also some doubts about the evaluation standard of administrative acts.For another thing, some practical conditions provide moral hazard acts with exemption probability, intensifying moral hazard actually. When civil servants loosen their moral requirement and come across the information asymmetry, irreversible behavior, fuzzy satisfactory or unsound regulation, etc; their moral hazard will breed naturally. Form the perspective of civil servants, the agent and service provider get a split. In the relationship of client-agent, because of the rights ownership and usufruct, civil servants have their distinct advantage to almost forestall the agent information that leads to bilateral information asymmetry.We consider the moral hazard mitigation in civil servants fulfillment on the basis of risk control. Hence the moral hazard is improperly stimulated by the objective inducement and subjective preference, the primary mission of mitigation is to limit the objective inducement which is also the purpose of building subjects’ firm willingness. According to this basis, we hold the idea that ways to reduce the moral hazard are concluded as the following:promote estimation level; improve inspection frequency; set evaluation standard; implement effective control; and obligate hedging pattern.