Research On Adverse Selection Risk Aversion In B2C E-Commerce

The development of Internet technology not only has greatly accelerated the speed of the consumers'access to information, but also has drastically decreased the cost on obtaining information. The popularization and application of intelligent terminals have supplied a virtual convenient channel for the exchange of information between buyers and sellers and shorten the distance of businesses'and consumers' time and space. But the most critical issues those enterprises face is how to carry out business transaction besides the satisfaction with releasing product information when they start to the B2C e-commerce. There are more and more false information and credit fraud cases on the Internet. It's more difficult to recognize the quality of goods in the'information explosion time'than'information lack time'. So there are more severe information asymmetries, and the adverse selection risk is exacerbated.As a B2C e-commerce market trading rules, the third-party secured transitions have already promoted the development of B2C e-commerce and achieved some success, However, the outbreak of a protest storm sparked the defects of the rules of 'seller security deposit', which caused by small sellers in Taobao Mall (TMall) in the end of2011. How to guide people to a smooth transaction in e-commerce, establish and maintain a fair competition order is also an important issue worthy of careful consideration.In view of the above problems, this paper construct the enterprise quality signal choice model and avoiding adverse selection model which based on the third party from the information asymmetry and adverse selection risk formation mechanism. The structure and content of the article shown as follows:the first chapter introduces the research background, sums up the domestic and international research and status, makes clear of the purpose and significance of the research and describes the research content and methods systematically; the second chapter analyzes the product circulation process and characteristics in e-commerce, mainly through the analysis of consumer purchasing process to analyze the emergence of information asymmetry and make a further analysis of process that how the information asymmetry effect the adverse selection risk, which lays foundation for later analysis; the third chapter constructs the marketing signal selection game model with the assumption that there are only two kinds of enterprise-high quality and low quality in the market, which based on the comparative analysis of traditional and e-commerce marketing signal that under the analysis of consumer buying behavior in e-commerce, and this model illustrates that high costs of marketing can show the quality of goods by analyzing the pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium conditions, and then this chapter puts forward recommendations of e-commerce enterprise quality signal selection strategy by combining with e-commerce environment, competitors and corporate factors; In order to circumvent the B2C e-commerce adverse selection risk, the forth chapter constructs the quality choice model of seller quality selection and secure transaction model and optimizes the deposit system paid by the seller which can take buyer and seller's transaction into account; the fifth chapter verifies the conclusions of the model through current mainstream of the adverse selection risk aversion analysis from an empirical viewpoint; the sixth chapter makes a brief summary of this article as a whole, and puts forward to the follow-up study of the prospect.