Research On Credit Mechanism Design Of O2O Platform From The Perspective Of Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard

The Internet economy represented by the mode of O2 O brings convenience and benefits to people.At the same time,merchants use the virtual and uncertainty of the Internet and the characteristics of online and offline separation of the mode of O2 O to conduct fraud and improper performance of contracts.The mismatch between price information and quality information(high price can not represent high quality),and the frequent occurrence of "black workshop","Didi killing" events have led consumers to point the public opinion at the O2 O platform contracted with the merchants consumers will point the public opinion to the O2 O platform contracted with the merchants.In order to solve the problem of quality information asymmetry between merchants and consumers,and promote the harmonious and healthy development of Internet economy,this paper will stand in the perspective of adverse selection and moral hazard derived from asymmetric information,focusing on "how to build a credit mechanism on the O2 O platform".Firstly,this paper summarizes the development status of O2 O e-commerce in China,and briefly describes the concept of credit and the design direction of credit mechanism with the theoretical knowledge of transaction cost theory and information economics.Secondly,the optimal strategy combination is analyzed by establishing the transaction game model between merchants and consumers under information asymmetry,so as to discuss the construction strategy of adverse selection slow-release mechanism and moral hazard resolution mechanism.Finally,the "Meituan.com" was selected as the research object,and the credit mechanism effect of "Meituan.com" was analyzed.The methods and shortcomings of the "Mei Tuan" platform in improving the quality supply and solving the information asymmetry were discussed.A representative practical problem to explore the perfect path of the credit mechanism.In addition,by analyzing representative real problems,we can explore the construction path of credit mechanism more comprehensively.The main findings of this paper include:(1)Constructing a signal transmission mechanism represented by "credit rating" and “guarantee” can effectively alleviate the problem of adverse selection,but to ensure a high enough signal camouflage cost and credit guarantee;(2)Under the premise that the market structure is the platform-oriented vertical integration,the credit incentive mechanism based on the"intermediate pricing mechanism","entry and exit mechanism" and the "qualitymonitoring" can effectively solve the moral hazard problem,but only when the platform can identify the real quality information,dishonest fine is high enough and social planners(such as the government)active supervision can play a role;(3)Through the analysis of the operation of the credit mechanism of "Mei Tuan",it is found that the establishment of the mechanism is relatively complete,but the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard still exist.At the same time,the low degree of vertical integration also reduces the efficiency of "Mei Tuan" in solving adverse selection and moral hazard.In addition,based on the above research results,this paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations based on national conditions.