Coordinating And Optimizing The Channel Of Crop Seed Supply Chain

As multinational seed companies swarming into the Chinese market and continuous to extrude the living space of domestic seed enterprise, competition in crop seed industry is becoming more and more fierce. Crop seed industry in China is entering a new stage, characterized by selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior. The old sales channel is hard to meet the new market environment requirements. Research work on coordinating and optimizing the crop seed supply chain is of great meaning. This paper selects the supply chain of crop seed, with long cultivating time, short selling time and high uncertainty demand, to model the decision-making behavior of members in supply chain under completely competitive market or price depended demand market. In crop seed supply chain with one supplier (producer) and one seller, based on newsvendor model, this paper depicts the decision-making behavior of supplier, leader of supply chain without the control of pricing, to stimulate seller to make his decision for the aim of integral optimal. The inventory decision and pricing decision and profit allocation scheme were given in this paper.Under completely competitive market, through analysis, we get the conclusion: the scheme of full price return with a fixed proportion can make the performance reach optimal. However, for the applying of return policy, coordinating profit cannot be distributed reasonably between supplier and seller, in fact all the coordinating profit flow to seller. To solve this problem, the"return rights fee"is introduced in this paper. If the seller wants to have the rights to return leftovers, he must pay supplier some money, namely return rights fee, when he submits the ordering decision to supplier, for the purpose to balance coordinating profit between supplier and seller. The determination of return rights fee depends on game ability and the status of members in supply chain. Add return rights fee into the common return policy, coordination was achieved.Under the market environment with price depended demand, farmers'demand of crop seed was influenced by sale price. The widely used return policy no longer has coordinating function, degenerating into wholesale price contract. Here we also use the"return rights fee"to achieve coordination. If the actual sales not reach the target set by supplier, seller must pay supplier some return rights fee for the unmeet demand. If wholesale price and return price meet certain required conditions, expect profit of supply chain can increase to the optimal target. And with a appropriate return rights fee, coordinating profit can be distributed reasonably between supplier and seller. The determination of return rights fee depends on game ability and the status of members in supply chain.