Design Of Multi-attribute Purchase Contract And Bargaining Negotiations

Auction is an effective method for companies to save cost and develop efficiency.With the current economic development, the traditional price-based single attribute auction mechanisms had not satisfied the practical demand. the utilities of which using mechanism in multi—attribution auction have greatly increased. In this paper, based on the deficiency of current research, applying mechanism design theory such as Revelation Principle, a two stage multi-attribute mechanism (TMAT) is designed with Incentive Compatibility Constraint(IC), Individual Rationality Constraint (IR), et al.The concrete model and research method for the design of multi-attribute mechanism are given. The concrete model of two stage multi-attribute purchase mechanism is given based on conceptions of mechanism theory and bargaining theory. The two-stage procurement model is a sequential mechanism consisting of an auction phase followed by possible bargaining phase. The analytical results show, under symmetric information, there exist the optimal quality to realize the system's optimal performance; and under asymmetric information, the bidders will report their costs truthfully in the auction stage. In the bargaining stage with asymmetric information, there exists a unique equilibrium made up of re-decided price and qualities, which implement allocation efficiency. The paper also presents the criteria according to which the procurer decides whether to bargain or keep the contact in auction stage. And the model was analyzed and numerical simulation.