Empirical Study Of Chinese Listed Company's Management Equity Incentive And Corporate Performance

The separation of ownership and management is a significant feature in the governance structure of modern enterprise,and it also brings the agency problem that puzzles the enterprise in a long time.After western scholars have studied for many years,thc equity incentive,as a long-term incentive way,can reduce the cost of agency problem,improve the performance of the enteiprise,and make better the governance structure and the incentive mechanism. In the last century,the equity incentive had been approved and spreaded widely in western countries,and it has made great success.China has adopted the equity incentive since 1990,but the equity incentive spreaded slowly because of the restrict of the law and policy. With the success of the split share structure reform and the improve of the law,more and more Chinese listed companies adopt the equity incentive mechanism,and this incentive way has made significant achievement.This article researches the correlation between managerial ownership and performance of the enterprise in two ways.After summaiying the research results of the equity incentive,this article elaborates the theory of the equity incentive,then analysis the correlation between managerial ownership and performance of the enterprise in different dimensions and proposes the hypothesis of this article.This article bases on the state-owned companies and the private companies from 2006 to 2009 in our country,analyzes the correlation between managerial ownership and performance of the enterprise. After the regression analysis,we find that the correlation is not linear relationship,and get the optimal managerial ownership level in the state-owned companies and the private companies.Lastly,according to the analysis of theory and the results of the regression analysis,we propose the results of this article and the suggestion.