A Study Of The Problem Of The Hidden Rules In The Game Between Central And Local Governments Under The Authorization System Depended On The Situation And The Correction Mechanism

The relationship between central and local government has always been political science, economics one of the key issues. Since the reform and opening up of China, central-local government relations has been a lot of complex changes. On the one hand, the central as the country's overall governance will be required to mobilize local initiative, and to ensure that local loyalty to the country; On the other hand, as a prelude to the pull of economic reform, especially in the financial system, driven by growing local autonomy, increasing competition between the local process, local government and the various Central Government form of the game. Game between the governments essentially is a normal form of the relationship behavior, behavior can be achieved by the two sides in the game rules may be established to maximize expected. Currently the game between the governments both in theory and in practice there are tend to be mature. However, in China's central and local governments during the game, but there are a variety of different government through the game is not conducive to a stable equilibrium state of the problem.Authorization system depended on the situation is a system of the central government's handling of the relationship between central and local government. Refers to the central government in dealing with local government relations, the overall objective of the central as the standard, according to different time, different events, different objects made of different authorization in order to achieve central control to a system of intergovernmental relations. Emergence and development of the authorization system depending on the situation own inherent characteristics of the formation of our relationship between central and local government and not by the relationship between local governments have had a profound impact. It is central to the unspoken rules of the game intergovernmental phenomenon of the structural causes, also the country's reform process is based on a tentative result, in China, the soft budget constraint in the process of governance, information asymmetry and monitoring mechanism is not standardized it also increased in the reform of national governance back on track after the adverse consequences. Local government and various local governments in dealing with their relationship resulted in the phenomenon of hidden rules of the game . Potential rules of the game between the central and local governments form through rational calculation in several rounds of interaction during the game, it's hidden under a system of informal to formal agreement, the nature Is how to public power and public favor disposal agreement. This informal agreement to obtain their own interests for the common goal, through the formal system of incentives and punishment mechanism for the formation of both constraints, and manifested by mutual interaction of the various behaviors. Against the Central government's various policies, such as withdraw the financial powers and render the transaction management, spur the earas with better economic situation, promoted to championship, regulate with the administrative means and change the rules of the game unilateral, local Government To start the game with the central with the strategy such as maximize the financial, wealth hide in the civil, alternative implement the policies.These hidden rules of the game behavior produce series adverse impact under the premise of the functions is not clears between the government and the market, on the one hand erosion of the interests of the nation and people, on the other hand chewing the foundation of the relationship of the state government's normal and healthy development. To ensure the relationship between the center and the local government's normal and healthy development, to ensure them to form a stable equilibrium relationship, we must study the unspoken rules in the games phenomena between the center and local .to the structural causes of the unspoken rules in the games behaviors between them, we must eliminate the non-normative, the opacity and the unfairness in the Authorization system depended on the situation.First, award the power institutionalized but depended on the situation, and reform of other issues whom to help to relate the authorization system depended on the situation, such as the public budget system, the information disclosure system, the monitoring system. Not only cancel the root of the authorization system depended on the situation, but also disappearance the rooms of the growth of the system. Only in this way, we can make sure the relationship grow healthy between the center and local governments.