Reconstruction Of The Corporate Governance Structure And System Of State-owned Commercial Banks

After many years' reform and development, compelling changes have happened in the financial system and financial structure of our country. Finance has already become one significant variable hi the economy and our life. These make us delighted. But at the same time we can find the insufficiency and shallow administrative levels of such institutional reform, especially when the state - owned commercial banks are concerned. It is not optimistic for us to consider their integrated performances: the operating status has not straightened up at all, the quality of assets has not been improved obviously, the capital is in great shortage and the risks have been accumulated increasingly. There are a lot of reasons accounting for these. But the key is the ignorance of corporate governance. This paper aims at the usage of corporate governance structure theory to pursue the institutional evolution analysis and institutional reconstruction of state-owned commercial banks.The paper is divided into three parts. First it begins with the meaning and definition of corporate governance structure and the arise of corporate governance, deploys embedded research about this question, using the principal - agent theory of enterprise contract theory, the entrepreneurial theory of the form and stake - holders theory, and analyzes comparatively certain kinds of typical corporate governance models. Consequently all the above offer a new theoretical angle of view for the institutional analysis of state-owned commercial banks and prepare theoretical matting for this. Then, the paper puts up a great deal of demonstrative analysis about the institutional evolution of state-owned commercial banks. The study comes to a conclusion that the fundamental problem is the defection of institution: the deformity of property rights leads to the void position of principals, and the state - owned commercial banks are severely short of banking governances. Thereby the utility function of state - owned commercial banks and the behavior of managers are dissimilated. On this basis while using the successful experiences of foreign commercial banks and combining the reality of our country, this paper puts forward some assumptions and thoughts of accelerating the reconstruction of the institution of state-owned commercial banks. That is: to push the reform of shareholding system of state - owned commercial banks to optimize their structure of property rights, quicken the construction of internal governance structure of the state - owned commercial banks to perfect the incentive and constraint mechanisms, and strengthen the external institution construction to make the governance of external market been paid equal attention to.