Credit Rationing In The State-owned Financial System Changes - The Reform Of Financial Controls And Business Thinking

There are two key questions about financial institutional reforms:the re-construction of central bank's functions and thecommercialization of state-owned banks (SOBs). But, undoubtedly,both of these kinds of reforms have been in dilemma by now. As theaim of this paper, the author tries to look fOr some answers to how tocarry on reforms of financial control of central bank andcommercialization of SOB,' not from the whole, but from one side:the credit rationing.Different from the loan scale administration which is often usedin the developing countries, in western econoniic theories, creditrationing is divided into two types: first, the loan administration ofcentral bank, such as scale control, interest rate administration, etc;second, the loan rationing of commercial banks in loan market, which.is caused by the asymmetric infOrmation in real economy. Owing tothese two types of its content, the analyses of Chinese credit rationingprovide clues to Chinese financial control and commercial reforms ofSOB,'This paper is consisted of four chapters as following:The first chapter is a guide to this paper. At the beginning, theauthor gives a brief explanation of the cause and procedure of Chinesestated-owned financial institutional transfer, pointing out the reasonthat led to the dilemma of financial reforms. The author thinks the keyto next step of Chinese financial reforms is to re-construct therelationship between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and SOBs, whichmeans China must set up the market transactions between SOE, andSOBs instead of the transactions by the willingness of governmentnowadays.1 Thesntralbhineselthof,f；an scalLe lati口eakeneLIS"ICS:ale adlThe second chapter analyses the credit rationing of Chinesecentral bank. Firstly, the author explains the cause of several stages ofChinese central bank's credit rationing. On the basis of that, theauthor, using the game theory, studies the SOB's characteristics underloan scale administration .The central bank is rationing credit throughthe national credit plan, its "leakage" is very huge, so its effects areweakened. At the same time, in the "gray" credit market brought bythis "leakage", the central bank loses its full effectiveness to loanscale administration. This provides a chance for China to establish anew credit rationing mechanism. One key point in that is the legal.environment should be improved. But from another side, because ofthe weak national finance and it's too difficult to make the publicproprieties distinct by now, the Chinese government has to go onassuming the obligation of controlling finance though its cost ishigher and higher, so, it is too ideal just to ask the State abandon thecontrol from financial fields.The third chapter gives analysis of credit rationing of SOBs.Since Chinese economic reforms, the interdependent relationshipsamong the State, SOEs and SOB,, which is often called the" explicittri-contract relationships", have come into being gradually, suchresults in SOB's variety which acts through the "gray" financialmarket, especially" the gray financiaI markets within system" whenSOB, ration the loan. But the author thinks, such variety is effectivesomehow from the view of institutional transfer because it maybe leadto financial institutional innovation. Owing to the radical change inChinese economic structure, the way to carry on SOB's reform lies inthe transactions between SOBs and non-state owned economic unitiesby market rules.This chapter also emphatically analyses "the unwillingness toloan of SOBs "-one important part of SOB 's credit rationing nowadays.The author owes it mainly to the asymmetric information which is..very serious in Chinese loan market. SOB's unwil4ingness to Ioanmakes the credit rationing is of semi-equilibrium that brings about theleakage of financial effectiveness but also means th6 possibili...