"chinese Room Argument" Problem Discussed

One of the most engrossing and delightful philosophical discussions of the last few decades is the discussion from John Searle's Chinese Room Argument on the cognitive states of mind.Searle, with his paper "Minds,Brains,and Programs"(Searle,1980a),aims to show the cognitive states, such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality,subjectivity,and understanding,could never be recreated in computer system,however complex and accurate of the programs.Many of his challengers,on the other side,is convinced that an appropriately programmed computer literally has cognitive states(i.e.an algorithm for manipulating symbols).As the enormous debates have been evoked by the CRA,the general consensus among commentators is that the CRA has its deficiency,and not withstanding the popularity of the systems reply in some perspectives,nevertheless there is remarkably little agreement on exactly how and why it is defective.In this paper,I aim to point out that:the conflict in Searle's mind is the confusion of the methodological differences between his naturalism and phenomenal scientific study on the notion of reducibility,by using the three tools:commonsense,logical structure and most powerful one--methodology of scientific thought experiment.Scientific ideas,like a faith spreading people,are subject to a kind of natural selection,and this might look a little bit superficial.But the selective forces that scrutinize scientific ideas are not arbitrary or capricious.They are exacting,well-honed rules and they do not favor pointless self-serving behavior.They favor all the ink laid out in textbooks of standard testability,evidential support,precision,quantifiability,consistency,inter-subjectivity,responsibility,universality, progressiveness,independence of cultural milieu,and so on.Thus it seems that science inside should be the reduction of observation or hypothesized events into a theory which explains all the observed or hypothesized events;this definition gives the impression that science is "absolute" and not subject to bias,and the tradition of pragmatism as the factor outside the science.This is not the case;there is selectivity about what is researched and the applications of scientific knowledge are subject to selection for different uses.But this problem is not the issue this paper should focus on.However,I believe that the evaluation of the CRA will involve some more metaphysical considerations rather than those I mentioned above or the logical views,and the System Reply to CRA is in effect aimed at this distinction.Also,I believe that there is something more than logical structure--the analysis from theory about Probability might be worth more efforts. The problem I attempt to clarify in this paper partly is Searle's outdated knowledge of commonsense,which causes a conflict in Searle's thought.On the one hand,he concerns that based on this commonsense knowledge,the mental phenomenon that his non-understanding any Chinese character is something like "intuition" with a realistic property,virtually is even no necessary to mention.That is to say,he believes that intentional states must be objective full of realistic phenomena because that is what his commonsense background tells him.But his commonsense also tells him;on the other hand,that understanding or intentionality is something of consciousness in the existence of subjective mental phenomena,which can't be reducible and observe at the atom-like version like what is going on in physics or mathematics.The dilemma is coming to be that:if the world is entirely physical,then subjective mental states ought to be reducible to physical atomic states;if they are not,then it appears there are two kinds of reality, neither of which is reducible to the other.But a further is his claim that he isn't a dualist,although he argues that consciousness is "ontologically distinct" from physical properties.I am in opposition to Searle,baffled as to how his view isn't dualism.According to his "commonsense", Searle's mind embodies the belief to naturalize intentionality but to label it an irreducible mark. The confused and inconsistent knowledge of commonsense forces Searle to such a situation where Searle has to hedge his bets,therefore,he resorts to the word "intuition".For that,Dennett argues with his diagnosis of the CRA which relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory about the essential nature of intentional content;such theories often yield non-intuitive results in non-standard cases,and so cannot be judged by such intuitions,although this thought experiment against computationalism and strong AI survives concrete counter force,including Block's(1998) internalized systems reply,Fodor's(1991b) deviant causal chain reply,and Hauser's(1997) unconscious content reply.According to Dennett, the philosophic intuition of the need for a conscious agent changes with the computation mathematics of von Neumann and Turing.It is no doubt that the contribution of Searle's CRA to cognitive science is tremendous. Throughout this paper I give a partly supportive role of Dennett's Intuition pumps,a thinking way he brought into bloom,nevertheless,merely the way itself is not the whole story nor can explain the thrust of his entire thought.More graphically,when some bafflement on Searle's philosophy sticks our mind,the moment you are caught up into this book by Dennett's distinguished thinking style,the first thing to you must be in quest for every detailed content about intentionality's value. By doing so,you may wonder what the image of human related to intentionality is and what is the different idea Dennett presents in his Intuition pumps--thought experiment from other understanding of Searle? Regarding the former question,it is generally believed that intentionality is a chief sponsor to produce human's activities and his view of intentionality is commented as kind of instrumentalism.However,I do not presume to paint the image of intentionality with such one broad-brush stroke because Dennett's thought is drew on the mechanism and extremism canvas.Through the shifts of terminology and the tweaking of detail,I contend that Fodor's basic claims and arguments are remarkably consistent.I have not here attempted to be wholly comprehensive in my coverage of his work.But,I have attempted to trace and cast into clear relief the real patterns that persist throughout his representational theory of mind(RTM).And for such reason Fodor portrays a new metaphor of digital computer,retrenches the misleading to the relationship between commonsense and representational theory,and exceeds every perspective in cognitive science.