| This dissertation precisely analyses and discusses the cause, background and process of the Soviet Union's policy's change to the East Germany and West Germany between in March and August in 1953.The author appraises the gain and loss of the Soviet Union's policy to Germany in this period with the effective analysis method.This article includes three parts.Part One is the general summarization of the origin of German problem and Soviet Union's policy to Germany after the second world war. The Soviet Union's policy to Germany went through two phases from the Great War's termination to Stalin's passing away in March 1953:the first phase is from after the Great War to the establishment of the Western and Eastern Germany. The Soviet Union stood for establishing all-Germany administration, transformed the Germany to a unified democratic and peace-like country, and objected to German division; the second phase is from the formation of the western and eastern Germany to Stalin's passing away in 1953.The core of the Soviet Union's policy to Germany had been converted to German unification and neutrality. Different lines reflected the evolve of the Soviet Union's actual strength itself and reciprocal track of the Powers' relations.Part Two discussed in detail the process of the USSR's policy to Germany from Stalin's passing away in March 1953 to the termination of "July Plenary Assembly" held by CCCP in August. After Stalin's passingaway the Sovie Union's policy to Germany began to limited adjustment. This process ran through the Soviet Union's communist party internal power struggle, and the outcome of power struggle directly affected tendency to the Soviet Union's policy to Germany. On the surface, the Soviet Union still approved of the unification of the western and eastern Germany. In fact, the Soviet Union strengthened the domination in politics and support in economics to GDR, and emphasized that the unification must make a pretext as the West and GFR recognizing GDR. This altered in essence the unification and neutrality policy, and converted to urged the East and West recognized each other the western and eastern Germany.Part Three is the appraisal of the Soviet Union's policy's gain and loss to Germany with effective analysis method. The article argues that, in the whole the Soviet Union's policy to Germany is failure. The reason is that the four objects which were the Soviet Union's security interest, economical interest, political interest and the revolutionary interest, gave birth to serious distortion and deviation; The support to the allies of the Soviet Union evenly surpassed the reasonable degree that Stalin had thought. Although the Soviet Union successfully maintained the special relation with GDR, and partly realized its security interest and politics interest, the success made the Soviet Union's overdraft of economical interest as price. Thus according to effective analysis method, complacent degree of this policy's destination is very low. In other words, its country's interest was failure to accomplish contrasting toits costing. Owing to the Soviet Union's system's interior factors and the reverse influence resulting from reciprocal relations between countries, this deepened the Cold War's structure, established the phase of German dissociation, and forced the Soviet Union to pay more cost for confrontation. This experience is very grave and deep feeling of grief. |