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Based On The Principal-agent Relationship Between Supply Chain Risk

Posted on:2010-02-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:P ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2199360272494488Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Supply chain development in actual cooperation, causes to have the principal-agent problem, because information asymmetrical question between enterprises, Thus causes the risk the occurrence. Supply chain risk already to become the supply chain enterprise to manage loses money, cooperation defeat's substantial clause. Therefore, this article take supplies the chain risk as the main object of study, discusses through the principal-agent theory supplies the chain risk, its goal is through to supplies the chain risk the research to supply the chain enterprise to provide the circumvention supply chain risk the method and the suggestion, has certain theory and the practical significance.This article first elaborated the supply chain risk investigation's background and the significance, then proposed this article research mentality, the portal frame construction as well as the research technique. Then briefed the supply chain risk connotation and the characteristic, and narrated and commented the supply chain risk and principal-agent's related development theory as well as our country separately supplies the chain development condition and the supply chain risk investigation present situation.The next article aims at "the reversion choice" separately and "the moral question" two different category risks carries on the theoretical analysis, and to solved the relative risk to provide the rationale. "The reversion choice" the risk question proposed regarding the solution the signal transmission model, through to the model supposition, the analysis and the discussion proposes the solution reversion choice method and the model countermeasure, and puts forward other related countermeasure proposal. "The moral question" in the article also proposed regarding the solution the non-complete information's dynamic gambling model solves this risk problem, has analyzed the most superior strategy which under the condition the enterprise gambles mutually in different "the nature", based on the model discussion proposed again does not pass under the condition to solve this risk measure and the suggestion correspondingly, simultaneously proposed that other solution, guarantees the supply chain risk the circumvention.From this article research angle of view, the union "three deer" the business risk causes bankrupt the concrete case to embark finally, related the theory to the preamble based on the principal-agent the risk analysis to carry on the confirmation and the analysis.
Keywords/Search Tags:supply chain risk, principal agent, adverse selection, moral hazard
PDF Full Text Request
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