Based On Game Theory Of High-tech Sme Performance Management And Incentive Mechanism

As knowledge economy's carrier and the core, science and technology become a huge propelling force for a country's economic development and the social progress. The modern competition has already changed to the competition of high technology and new technology, and as the high technology and new technology original place and proliferation place, SMEs become the nucleus of the high tech achievement industrialization. How to manage knowledge staff well, to bing the knowledge staffs work enthusiasm into full play, and to raise the human capital use efficiency, is a key question that the high-tech SMEs face.Although in our country High-tech SMEs' performance management system has begun to take shape, there exsit many problems which seriously affect performance evaluation's function of keeping staff, using staff and training staff. As enterprise's core competitiveness, the knowledge staffs play an important role in enterprise's development. In order to make performance management playan active incentive function, we must explore pointed stronger, more effective performance management and incentive mechanism on base of the knowledge staff's characteristic, the demand and the incentive pattern.As an methodology game theory is studies that considers decision-making when the policy-making main body's behaviors have direct interaction as well as the balanced question of this kind of policy-making, and is also a good method to consummate the performance management. But, at present very few High-tech SMEs' staff can understand and applicate the game theory. Based on game theory and the principal-agent theory, studying knowledge staff's performance management in High-tech SMEs, fully displaying performance management's incentive function, and designing Optimal incentive mechanism for the knowledge staff, are very important to our country High-tech SMEs' development. The main research content and the structure of this paper are as follows:First, is the rationale, elaborated game theory and the principal-agent theory's basic content and the model method this article uses, and reviewed the study and application of game theory in the human resources performance management, and summaried the study and application of the principal-agent theory in incentive theory.Next, this paper has defined and introduced High-tech SMEs' characteristic based on existing literature and elaborated the knowledge staffs definition, knowledge staff's individuality characteristic and the operating characteristics in the High-tech SMEs, builded the foundation for as follows thorough analysis.Once more, is performance management gambling analysis for the High-tech SMEs. This paper analyzes the performance management implication, the process and the function, and has made the comparative analysis between common staff achievements' characteristic and the knowledge staff achievements' characteristic in the High-tech SMEs, explaining the necessity of introducing the game theory in High-tech SMEs performance management. Then this paper has analyzed essential factors in performance management gambling model, and has constructed the gambling model separately under two different conditions: High SMEs inspecting and knowledge staff working diligently is independent, and high-tech SMEs inspecting and knowledge staff working diligently is dependent, and proposed target-oriented conclusion and the suggestion.Finally, this paper has studied the High-tech SMEs incentive method, and has carried on the thorough analysis to knowledge staff's incentive factor in High-tech SMEs, and introduced the commonly used knowledge staff incentive method. Then based on the principal-agent theory, this paper carries on the design to the High-tech SMEs incentive mechanism. Based on the principal and agent's inherent contradictions and keeps in balance the mechanism, relationship between principal and agent in the High-tech SMEs is analyzed. On the base of predecessor's literature, this article has carried on the expansion to the model, under the asymmetrical information condition, separately designed optimal incentive contract to the High-tech SMEs knowledge team as well as the knowledge staff.