Study, Based On The Mode Of Product Innovation, Supply Chain Collaboration And Cooperation Mechanism

Nowadays, innovation cooperation in a supply chain is one of the best choices forboth companies and supply chains in fierce competitive environments. However, thetraditional way of innovation ignores cooperation between upstream and downstreamcompanies in a supply chain. This dissertation addresses the innovation co-operationalmodel and co-operation mechanism.Firstly, through research on the traditional innovation process in a supply chain, thenew product innovation process model in a supply chain has been put forward. In thismodel, members in the supply chain, including customers, compose a co-operative team.By working together, channel members and customers in a supply chain have moretransfer and sharing of relevant information. This improves the performance of theinnovation process which includes proposing new ideas, new product development, production, and market operations. The operating basis and advantages of the newproduct innovation process are also further analyzed in this dissertation.Secondly, this dissertation examines the selection of the cooperation mechanism ofsupplier innovation in a two-stage supply chain composed by a single supplier and singlebuyer. In order to decrease risks in innovation, the supplier, as the innovation subject, signs a cooperation agreement with buyer, and accordingly determines the innovationinvestment and wholesale price; the buyer announces the order quantity. We obtain thefollowing conclusion: (a) if the price demand elasticity of the new product is small, thebuyer's commitment to quantity could stimulate the supplier's innovation, but sacrificesits own expected profits; whereas, the buyer's flexibility in the quantity order couldstimulate the supplier's innovation, but sacrifices its own expected profits; (b) theelasticity of the price demand of a new product and supplier's commitment and flexibilityto the wholesale price, do not affect the innovation investment, wholesale price, buyer'sexpected quantity and expected profits; c) however, the supplier's and the supply chain'sprofits could improve in regards to the flexibility of the wholesale price.Lastly, this dissertation examines the selection of the cooperation mechanism ofbuyer innovation in a two-stage supply chain. In order to decrease risks in innovation, thebuyer, as the innovation subject, signs a cooperative agreement with the supplier, andaccordingly determines the innovation investment and order quantity; the buyerannounces the wholesale price. Consider the R&D risk, we obtain the followingconclusion: (a) a supplier's commitment to the wholesale price could stimulate thesupplier's degree of innovation and improve the buyer and supply chain's expected profits;(b) for a given amount of the expected demand, if the demand variance is high, thesupplier prefers a commitment to the wholesale price; whereas, its preference is to remainflexible;(c) regardless of the level of demand variance, the buyer's expected profits arealways larger if the supplier commits in advance to a wholesale price than if it remainsflexible;(d) when the supplier commits to a price, the innovation investment, wholesaleprice, expected quantity and the supplier's expected profits do not depend on whether thebuyer has flexibility on order quantity or not; (e) however, the buyer's commitment willsacrifice the expected profits of both the supply channel and itself.(f)the possibility ofsuccessful R&D does not affect conclusions (a)(b)(c)(d) and (e).