Risk Of Social Security Funds Based On Principal-agent Chain

For the past few years, legal cases of the social security funds are under the spotlight. On the one hand, we have national social security to ensure tactic reserve in the system building, set up personal account to stimulate accumulation, at the same time, we have kinds of enterprise annuity to replenish.on the other side, and keeping value of these funds makes it necessary to enter a market. In all, entrusting investment is now becoming a trend. To 2008, incurrence funds come to 100,000 billion and be an important part of social security funds. This paper includes 3 items of these funs: national security fund, insurance fund and enterprise annuity.Widespread sense of social security fund investment, multilayer principal-agent relationship exists. And the following characteristics:the principal-agent chain length. The initial and final (ginseng agent is a multi-stage principal-agent relationship between, In the end the initial client is indirect supervision rather than direct supervision; Besides the initial and final client, client outside the agency chain link with double identity. The social security fund of the principal-agent relationship with many basic task principal-agent model, a single principal and agent of multiple principal-agent model" and "multi-phase principal-agent model", which is relatively complex, the principal-agent relationship should concern is "bound" and "incentive mechanism of supervision mechanism. In the national social security fund operation "3" principal-agent relationships, the relationship between the second and the third level can be reference market supervision mechanism. For social security fund, multilayer the principal-agent relationship formed in the process of operation funds complete chain of social security fund, namely the principal-agent chain. Therefore, in the absence of cases, the trustee into actual trustee, this is the Chinese special circumstances the special phenomenon.China's social security fund problems appeared in "practical client" link. At present, China is not only related to obtain public pension funds, and the information is lack of professional knowledge. Therefore, the general fund established representative members can benefit from employees representative organization (for example, the employer representatives and other experts with the board or foundation) is a professional institution diplomacy, The reasonable incentive mechanism should be a kind of style, which requires:rewards for fund managers with funds should be closely related to the benefits of members, Punishment should be sufficient to prevent the risk fund manager. China's special problems need strengthening "discriminating" concept, and how we ignore the practice effectively reflect";" Perfecting the legal system of execution, need more effective in China should establish and perfect the internal control mechanism of fund managers and mutual checks as establishing and perfecting China's pension fund supervision mechanism of priority. As China's current supervision mechanism, the key is to establish or designate a national pension funds, and regulatory agencies for pension fund investors must comply with the regulations. To solve the principal-agent problem from the Angle of Latin American countries, strict supervision mode in the short term than Euramerican countries more suitable for China's regulatory mode, therefore, we can try some policies to reference.