Research On Optimal Auction Mechanism Of Multi-item In C2c

Online auction, as a extension and development of traditional auction, plays a more and more important role in e-commerce field. Online auction can be divided into single-item auction and multi-item auction based on the number of items. In recent years, the development of multi-item online auctions is extremely fast, online transactions are tens of billions of dollars, online auction patterns have also continued to emerge. But multi-items auction theory has not yet formed a mature system, with different efficiency. How to design the auction rules allow maximum benefit of buyers and sellers is very important. In this thesis, based on multi-item auction online auction research, with the traditional auction theory, game theory as the research tool to explore the issue of optimal mechanism auction of C2C multi-items auction.First, compared with the development of domestic and international status of the auction theory, analysis and synthesis of research, I adopt qualitative judgments and quantitative calculation, use the revenue equivalence theory, game theory, optimization theory methods, and analyze the actual auction process. Next, the thesis brings into mechanism design and display principle based on the models in a variety of mechanisms, analyzes multi-Item various auction mechanisms, obtains the optimal auction mechanisms. Following, it discusses multi-item auction mechanism-Buying a mechanism to establish the mechanism for the corresponding model. Finally, this mechanism based on the above analysis, it obtains the optimal strategy of Group-buying auction mechanism.Sequential auctions, in the first auction, for the seller's reservation price, there is a threshold- bigger than the reservation price.Whether to set the reserve price or not, the seller should Optimally choice relatively smaller Minimum bid increment.Sequential auction exists optimal strategy Ss,p, that if the bidder's valuation is bigger than the threshold, then the bidder will real bid; otherwise, the bidders will not participate in the first auction; while in the second auction when bidders'valuations are not less than the seller's reservation price, the bidders will participate in the auction with the real bidding. In two successive English auction, there exists a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium----Refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, that is bidder takes semi-participation strategy Sb,P. Sequential auctions for multiple items, whether or not open the reserve price, will not affect the seller's optimal allocation strategy and access to the corresponding expected total profit.Two different item auctions in the independent, binding auction and mixed auction will have its own mixed optimal strategy. According to sets up or not, and the different expect profits with all kinds of bidders, it exists the different optimal strategy combination.Under the assumption of the baseline model, that the same as in the independent private model, if the bidder's risk is neutral and symmetric, the optimal strategy of Group-buying mechanism is not bidding with the valuation v less than qN otherwise biddingθ(v).This thesis is divided into six chapters:The first chapter of this thesis mainly introduce the background and significance of the topic, research status at home and abroad, a brief description of the research methods and research ideas.The second chapter is a brief overview of the online auction, including the definition and classification of the auction, public valuation model,private valuation model, the basic form of the auction, and the origin and development of online auctions as well as the difference between the traditional auction and online auction.The third chapter is focused on the homogeneous multi-items, heterogeneous multi-items and multi-items auction optimal mechanism.The fourth, the thesis brings into mechanism design and display principle based on the models in a variety of mechanisms, analyzes multi-Item various auction mechanisms, obtains the optimal auction mechanisms.Chapter V introduces a multi-items auction mechanism-Group-buying mechanisms and making the corresponding model. The thesis analyzes the corresponding mechanism based on foregoing chapters, conclude the optimal strategy about the Group-buying mechanism.Chapter VI is a summary of the full text. We summarize the full text and put forward some suggestions about the future research.