Research On The Whole Process Investment Control In Railways Construction

Railways construction are an important national security and measures for the government, which can provide public services and improve the quality of life. Nowadays, China is in the flourishing period of railways construction and an enormous sum of money for construction is needed. However, the performance of cost control is still not very satisfying and how to improve it successfully grasps increasing attention in both theory and practice. Most of the forepassed studies on cost control divided the whole process of the construction project into several phases and took cost control measures separately, while less study on cost control focuses on the relationship among the stakeholders of the construction project and solve the problem of cost control systemically through the effective join of the different phases. This research attempts to improve the performance of cost control. To achieve these objectives, methods such as literature review, logical analysis are applied to analyze the problems as follows:1. Starting from the special contract relationship, the investment controlling system of railways construction is divided into three levels: administrative supervision level, project agent level and project contractor level, which are facing different problems of principal agent and investment control.2. The critical problem of the investment control in the first principal agent level of railways construction is the railways failure caused by lacking of supervises from the initial principal in the public property rights. Based on the viewpoint of the government supervised theories like the congress control theory, etc. and the successful experience for reference, we construct the administrative supervision system of the investment project in our country, including the interior and exterior supervision systems. The core of the interior supervision system is the checks and balance mechanism and liability investigation mechanism between the government functional departments. While the exterior supervision system is combined with the people congress supervision and social supervision.3.The critical problem of the investment control in the second level contract relationship of the railways construction is the vacancy of project juristic person caused by the residual claim without transferability in the public property rights. The public project governance theory is applied in which the balance and coordination of each stakeholder is realized through the allocation of their authority, responsibility and profits. 4.Under the arrangement of the principal agent relationship system in the second level, the investment control problem of the contract relationship in the third level is transformed into the cost management and investment control problem with the limited risk sharing of project proprietor(construction agency). And the risk management and control problems of the contractor and owner contract in construction market are required to be solved. In view of this, under the initiative control perspective, the risk sharing and controlling based whole process investment control of the substitute construction enterprise considering the contract management as method is constructed in this paper. 5. Based on the system theory and cybernetics, an incentive improving model taking the construction unit as the core is established. In this model, the whole process of railways construction is divided into three phases: ex-transaction phase, transaction phase and construction phase. The goal of ex-transaction phase is to improving the quota and investment estimate model and multitask principle-agent incentive for design unit. The goal of transaction phase is delivering the incentive goal of cost control. Its approach is to selecting the way to transact based on the triangular fuzzy numbers and integrating the constructability and value engineering. The approach of construction phase is pre-control and post-control based on identifying the risks of cost control and the game of the supervision for the construction unit to avoid the conspiracy of the delegate of construction unit, the supervision unit and the contractor.