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A Study About The Quality Assurance Of Pork Industry In China

Posted on:2011-09-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y T LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360308959120Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Food is a basic material to ensure the survival of the people, our ancestor knew"Hunger breeds discontent"since ancient times .The quantity and quality of the food's supply is very important to people's livelihood. Among the food, pork plays a vital role in the daily diet of Chinese residents, it is an important source of protein in our population. China's production and consumption of the pork are both very huge. Since the founding of China, the production of the pork increased quickly, and the quantity of the pork became rich, especially after the reform and opening up.As the rapid development of China's pork industry, not only the daily consumption of residents can be insured, but also the quality improved. However, in order to get more improper benifit, some people began to abuse the Scientific and technological means in bad way. Our quality and safety of the food was destroyed, pork industry has also not been spared, "shouroujing", Zhushui pork incidents often appeared in press.It has become one of the most concerned issues of people's everyday life.This paper selected pork production firms and government departments as studying objects, used game theory to analyse their behavior options, so as to describe the reasons for quality problems of China's current pork industry. The analysis approved that safety supervision department plays an important role in the quality and safety guard of the pork industry. At last, through solving the optimal general form of the contract from the optimal principal-agent theory, obtained the conclusion that designing fixed wage and bonus incentive payment system combining is effective for ensure the safety supervision person's personnel level.This article was divided into five parts. The first chapter introduced the background of the main topics of this article, research ideas and methods, and paper structures. Based on the analysis of the similar problems, and most research paper about the pork industry in China,this paper choosed the relationship between manufacturers and safety supervision departments as research target, and the efficiency and the conditions of the latter was slao a focal point of this paper.The second chapter was based on the relevant economic theory and existing literature. This part analysed the choices of the firm's behavior in pork's quality assurance,which was also the main direction of current research. In this paper, the author summarized the literature in three aspects, the supply chain, China's pork production organization model and the establishment of meat traceability system information.In the third chapter, the author has carried on the analysis about the pork production firm and the safety supervisory department's relations in using game theory, through the process of both static and dynamic game analysis, the author obtained that the manufacturer cost,supervision cost, punishment intensity, incentive effect and so on has a respective impact on behavior choice of the manufacturer firm and the safety supervision departments. The possibility of illegal production of the manufacturers has a positive correlation with the its cost; the probability of safety supervision department work responsibly was negatively correlated with its cost, which was positively correlated with the nomal cost of the manufacturers, the social costs caused by misconduct, and the regular income of the firm.Chapter four introduced the principal-agent theory and the development of our regulatory approach in history and its current situation, and searched for the influencing factors of government and safety supervision department staff to gain maximum benefit through solving the general form of the optimal contract in principal-agent theory. Research showed that the cost of the government increased with the risk aversion or uncertainty revenue of the safety supervision. If the Government wants to reduce agency costs, they need to find ways to help workers increase their effort and safety supervision.Chapter five concluded on the basis of previous results, and then some suggestions were given.
Keywords/Search Tags:The quality and safety of the pork, Game theory, Principal-agent theory
PDF Full Text Request
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