The Analysis Of Mangers Of China's State-Owned Enterprises Based On The Bounded Nationality

The principal-agent problem of China's state-owned enterprises has been always a hot theoretical issue. With increasingly serious phenomenon of managers'violating interests of SOE, the studies focus on the restraint and incentive mechanism in the reform. Based on the bounded rationality theory, this thesis analyzes theoretical factors that may affect the behavior of SOE managers by using of bounded rationality. Due to the lack of status of rational analysis in their positions, the undersupply of existed institution leads to the behavior of managers'deviation. Reviewed by foreign experience of corporate governance and commission, this thesis tries to establish institutional arrangements in the transition of SOE reform and combine internal with external systems effectively. Finally, this thesis proposes policy recommendations about the establishment of professional manager market which improves the internal governance system.The reform of China's state-owned enterprises and the problem of the principal agent have both profound historical reasons and real theoretical basis. Based on the analysis of the characteristics of the state-owned enterprise managers'behavior, this thesis realize that the current executive appointment system and owner absence constraints managers'rationality. Besides, according to the bounded rationality theory, this thesis analyzes realization mechanism of rational degree in terms of mental costs, the information dimension, uncertainty, and institutional dimensions. This thesis also proposes to strengthen and improves the market and the enterprise system to solve the problem of China's state-owned enterprise reform, as well as the prosperity and stability of the national economy.