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Study On The Risk Of Moral And Mechanism In Construction Agency System Based On The Proprietor

Posted on:2011-04-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360305960479Subject:Engineering and project management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Construction Agent System dovetailed with the market economy is a new project management model. It introduces the professional management and improves the level of project management. However, this does not mean that the implementation of the Construction Agent System will be able to avoid the various kinds of construction risks. On the contrary, as Construction Agent System to break the traditional pattern of building models, so that the original investors, users, builders have to face the new risks and responsibilities, which bring about many new problems and new thinking.This paper introduces the concept of Agent System and the problems in the development process. Through studies the current situation of Agent System and previous research results, this paper explains the meaning of the agent system and the relationship between the parties, putting forward the problems of the implementation process. In order to build a theoretical foundation, this paper figures that the owner's risks mainly come from the moral hazard and the mechanism risk.Based on the analysis of agency by agreement, this paper uses the game theory to discuss the relationship between the commissioning party (the owner) and agent (agent unit) and gets the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution. On this basis, this paper figure out the risk factors of moral hazard and the basic principles in reducing cost, improving the expected utility and evading the risk. Based on the research of the various local policies and regulations related to Agent System, this paper indicates that the moral hazard will be further amplified once the mechanism risk came out.This paper establishes the risk prevention model for the moral hazard. In order to gives some theoretical solutions for the prevention of moral hazard, this paper analyzes the role of incentives and monitoring mechanisms and establishes the optimal incentives and monitoring model. This paper presents a few of advices related to institutional development, including improving market access system, improving the bidding system and the introduction of Model Contracts Agency System. These advices aim to establish a good atmosphere of Agency System market and contain the moral hazard; thereby the Construction Agency System market will become more standardized and orderly.
Keywords/Search Tags:Construction Agent System, Agency by Agreement, Game Theory, Risk Management
PDF Full Text Request
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