A Class Of Cournot Duopolies Under The Asymmetric Competition

While the ever-changing contemporary wave of high-tech development and the promotion of the process of economic globalization,consumer attitudes has becoming maturity,which made market environment changing every time and involve China's enterprises in asymmetric competition.The competitive environment which enterprises faces has been changing from relatively stable,predictable, static and controlled environment in the past to rapid oscillation,dynamic and unpredictable,confrontational strongly and almost uncontrollable environment now.In the situation of the asymmetric information and different percentage share of demand,It is a urgent problem to solve that how to find an efficient method to analysis this environment of incomplete information.The research methods of this article takes advantage of game theory and operational research to study how to reply the random effects of different percentage share of demand and asymmetric information for enterprises under demand slope uncertainty.We expect this outcome research could help modern enterprises in competitive environment to mare dominant strategy and increase the competitiveness of enterprises.With the current results of the Cournot competition model under unpredictable and asymmetric information,wo extended two cases:The demand slope uncertainty and different percentage share of demand.The extended model could better meet the requirements of the modern market.This extended model guides modern enterprise's competitiveness in a more practical significance. This article are mainly including the following two aspects:1.We focus on a class of linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products under demand slope uncertainty.One of them is the informed firm which has full information about its demand function.It is shown that if therealized demand slope is lower than the prior expected slope,then the informed firm obtains higher expected profit than the uninformed firm and if the realized demand slope is greater than the prior expected slope,the result is reversed.When making a credible commit to a higher level of output,then the uninformed firm can always gain higher profit than the informed firm.2.We focus on a class of lincar Cournot duopolics with differentiated products. Two firms own the whole primary demand,but each has the different per- centage,firm 1 has full information about its demand function(information advantage), the own-price effect is greater than the cross-effect.It is shown that if two firms has the same percentage share of demand,then the uninformed firm earns more;the informed firm earns more when it has more percentage share of demand,and the uninformed firm earns more when it has more percentage share of demand.In other words,the more percentage share of damand is a dominant strategy.