| The managerial equity incentives aim at coordinating the interest conflicts between managers and owners,solving agency problem.Since Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies(For Trail Implernentation) promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission was implemented in Jan.1st,2006,managerial equity incentives have been adopted widely. All the previously study on these questions are based on the stocks for interior employees which came into being in a special period.This paper tries to research the real managerial equity incentives from the shareholders perspective.On the one hand, we use event study method to find the market effect of equity incentive by the AAR and CAR statistics sampled by the listed companies announcing equity incentives.On the other hand,we analyze the corporate performance before and after the implementation.According to the analysis and empirical study,we can get the following conclusions: (1) The AAR and CAR of all samples are all significantly positive in the period between the trading day before announcement date and the trading day after.The result shows that the managerial equity incentives of Chinese listed companies are accepted by the investors.But the reaction of market is not positive of state-owned listed firms.(2) There is no stock price depressing by managers and directors before giving managerial equity incentive plans.The managers and directors doesn't trench on interests of shareholders(3)The corporate performance of most of the listed companies implementing equity incentives are improved,exclusive of industry factor.However,the empirical study doesn't support that managerial equity incentives in China can improve the value of investors after discounting the effect of earnings management.That is,in order to make the managerial equity incentives truly effective,we need to improve external market and regulatory system. |
