An Empirical Study On The Influence Of Corporate Governance On The Protection Of Minority Shareholders

The aim of the paper is to discuss the influence of corporate governance on the protection of minority shareholders. By means of empirical study, we expect to contribute to the research of this field and provide some theoretical references to the reformation of transferring enterprises to corporations.By means of careful research in correlative literature and integrating with the listed companies' facts, we find the important factors which reflect listed corporations governance structure (ownership structure, board structure and executive incentive mode) and the direct or indirect factors which reflect the protection of minority shareholders (cash dividend per share, large proportion stock splits, changing accounting policy, correcting accounting errors, abnormal related party transactions, abnormal guarantees). After analyzing the correlativity among variables, the hypotheses are put forward. Then we make partial correlation by using of SPSS 11.0. The results show that state, as the owner of state shares (state-owned shares, state-owned and corporate shares), is low efficiency on corporate governance, high proportion of state-owned shares is disadvantage to protect state-owned assets and the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Legal-person shareholders are more efficiency and better control than state shareholders. Public shareholders favor cash dividend. It can't be distinguished whether Public shareholders favor high proportion stock splits or not. The first shareholders profit by sacrificing the rights and interests of minority shareholders. By means of protecting the interests of listed companies, they protect the interests of minority shareholders and themselves indirectly. The influence of top five shareholders' shareholding proportion on the rights and interests of minority shareholders is the same with the first shareholder's shareholding proportion. Top five shareholders would rather collaborate than control each other.Independent directors don't play important part in decision-making and protecting minority shareholders as expected. Managerial ownership can prevent that majority shareholders usurp the rights and the interests of minority shareholders to a certain degree. But the proportion of managerial ownership isn't higher the result shows better. The interests of managers and majority shareholders are consistent when the proportion of managerial ownership is much too high. Consequently they would rather collaborate with majority shareholders than work hard. Increasing the wage of managers to a certaindegree can protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders. While the 'degree' is much too high or low the result is unexpected.The paper provides some theoretical references to the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders: optimizing the equity ownership structure, reforming board structure and reforming the stimulating and controlling mechanism of managers.The innovation of the paper is that we put forward the direct or indirect factors which reflect the protection of minority shareholders. Then we do regress analysis with corporate governance structure. According to the result, the paper provides some theoretical references to the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders.