| Based on information economics, this thesis investigates the principles of risk sharing in SME's financing. This thesis reviews the revolution of SMEs'financing theory and risk sharing systematically and explains the definition and main characteristics of Pareto efficient. Risk sharing is well expressed in the condition of both complete information and asymmetric information. Under complete information, we define necessary and sufficient conditions of risk sharing equilibrium and specific risk allocation among members if Pareto efficient is available. Asymmetric information is extensively existed among investors and financiers. As its simplicity, signaling game is widely used in incomplete information game and is a useful tool to explain the SMEs'financing process. This thesis establishes risk sharing contract between two investors differed in risk preferrence in the process of SMEs'financing and set up a Pareto efficient model. At last, signaling game mode is used and some useful conclusions are reached to ease the difficulty of SMEs'financing. |
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