Different Purpose For Land Requisition And Compensation In China

China is an agricultural country, in which the farmers account for 10% of the total population. Land is one of the most important resources which have close connection with agriculture, losing land means losing viability for farmers. The investigations shows, the issue for which the farmers appeal to the higher authorities for help is about the land, most of them focus on the land requisition. Since 1990s, with the speeding urbanization and the build-up land expanding, the conflict for land requisition becomes sharp. On the condition of marketization, it has been proved that the prevenient solution for land requisition problems in the planned economy system is unenlightened. This paper will analyze the benefit-maximized land requisition of government on the economic approach by the theory model, case study and empirical analysis, the main study contents and corresponding conclusions are as follows:1. Because of the different system of land ownership, law, land , finance and government achievement assessment, the Chinese government, especially the local government have the motivity to maximize the its own benefit in the land requisition.2. When the purpose of the government is to maximize the benefit on Land Use Rights(LURs), the higher the opportunity cost for the landlord is, the more compensation landlords will receive; if the requisitioned land area is not given, the higher the land value is, the more the compensation landlords will receive; while the land value is given, the more the compensation landlords receive, the more the land will be requisitioned.3. When the purpose of the government is to maximize the benefit on investment liaison, the land area is given, the government will reduce the compensation with the higher marginal benefit on investment liaison for land value.4. The landlords will change the social cost to force the government to increase the compensation or change the requisitioned land area for the purpose on self-benefit maximization; the government's benefit and landlords' benefit will not be maximal at the same time.5. It is exact that the Chinese government will reduce the requisition compensation for the infrastructure because of the limited finance.6. Using the data from the Zhejiang Province, we prove the conclusion of the theory model by the empirical analysis that the government will change the compensation depends on the market value of the requisitioned land and the opportunity cost for landlords. 7. The paper also introduces the category and form of compensation, including the "exoteric compensation" and "furtive compensation". The reason for "furtive compensation" is that the legal compensation is lower than the optimal compensation and the restriction of land development right.8. The facts which infect the compensation include the public character of the requisition, the equalitarian mentality and the sale form of LURs.9. At last, the paper analyses that how the landlords do to force the government to change the compensation to increase their own benefit.