The Research On Agent Incentive Problem In Government Procurement Process In Our Country

Government procurement is different from the individual procurement and enterprise procurement, the essential difference lies in the difference of the procurement principal part. The particularity of government as the main procurement makes the incentive problem in the government procurement process is different from the incentive problem in personal incentive procurement and enterprise procurement, and more subject to the impact of government procurement behavior. Since 1997 China's nationwide implementation of the government procurement system, the scales of government procurement are growing clearly, the procurement system has gradually improved, but because the impact of the information asymmetry in government procurement process it's accompanied by incentive problems ,which include the incentive problem of organizations including government procurement and the incentive problem between government and the provider. The impact of these incentive problems is being the key factor in the efficiency of procurement, so how to solve these incentive problems for upgrading the efficiency of government procurement is of great significance.The research of scholars at home and abroad aiming at the incentive problems in government procurement process is along two main lines: First line is the standardized research on the government procurement system which regulates the government procurement; Second line is the theoretical research on the principal-agent relationship in the government procurement process. This paper along the second main line ,selecting the principal-agent relationship in the government procurement process as the research object, studies with the agent's incentive problem, from the perspective of choice of procurement contracts ,try to introduce theoretical model analysis to help to give out the best procurement contracts forms to resolve these incentive problems, and then combines standardized research to give out a certain degree of policy meaning of further improving the government procurement system, explores the ways to upgrade the efficiency of government procurement.This paper, based on the summarize of the relevant literature, firstly, using of the principal-agent model analytical framework, makes a entire model description of the principal-agent relationship in the government procurement process, and provides a theoretical foundation for the further study of the text after; After, this paper makes a phased study on the incentive problem in the government process : The first stage is the research and development stage; The second stage is the production stage. The principal-agent relationships of the two are different from each other, and the incentive problems of the two stages are essentially different, so this paper, based on the characteristics of each stage, designs a variety of theoretical models to make research, through solving the models and the further reality analysis of the models' conclusion, puts forward the solution ways of the incentive problems in various stages targeted. Latterly, this paper takes some cases for example, in order to use the models' conclusion to solve the practical problems.The main research method of this paper is theoretical analysis method, such as model making and solving. On the base of the conclusions of theoretical analysis, at the end , this paper summarizes the conclusion of the full text, combining of the standardized research on the government procurement system, and presented a policy implications for improve the government procurement system. At the end, this paper also points out the insufficiency of this paper as well as the expectation on the direction of future research.