Role Change And Game Among Collector Producer And Protector

The purpose of this paper is to study the change of the way by which the state extracts resources from rural since 1949, further explore the change mechanism. The paper takes G Township as a study case, at the more 'micro' level, investigates the specific process of the levy change, this paper constructs a model of state activities boundary displacement, and employs game theory to analyze interactive behaviour between the state and peasants, exposes the cause of state activities boundary displacement.The paper argues that integrating peasants into control bounds leads to state activities boundary outspread while state as a collector extends its antenna into rural area, to form first role resonance. But in the environment of coercion, Peasants' response to the state begins to change from getting themselves integrated into gradually ensnaring coercion-wielding organization to passive resistance in productive activities. As a result , state contracts its boundary. After Peasants restore to natural state as producer, peasants who serve as their own protector play games with government. Conflicts of different degrees between peasants and local government compel state to shift its role into protector, and form role resonance again. In the "three-player" game, different mutative role relationship influences and determines their strategies, leads to different results. The interactive game among the three influences the relationship between state and peasants while state extracts resources from rural.The paper's angle is new and is put on resource extraction at lower rural level. Through the relationship change between state and peasants, the paper reveals state's character of coercion and compromise and peasants'character of obedience and defiance, interaction between state and peasants is the cause of means of levy and state configuration change, and is also the result of the change of tax object dependent on.