The Running Modes Of Closed-loop Supply Chain And Their Performances Research

With the awareness of environment protection and sustainable development, the importance of product recycling is increasingly being recognized. Therefore, Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), a new type of organization structure integrated by forward and reverse supply chain, emerges as the times require. The effective management of CLSC can not only be helpful to the sustainable development of society economy, but also bring about the obvious economic benefit to the enterprise and strengthen its competitiveness.This article studies the running modes of CLSC and their performances analysis. First, we contrast the differences between CLSC and traditional SC the basis of analyzing the extensive connotation of CLSC and CLSC management. Then we summarize the basic activities,functional structure and the characteristics of the CLSC and introduce the running modes of CLSC which are characterized by the collector in the reverse channel. There are three options for a manufacturer to collect used products:(1) she can collect them herself directly from the customers( Mode M), (2) she can provide suitable incentives to an existing retailer to induce the collection(Mode R ), or (3)she can subcontract the collection activity to a third party(Mode TP). After that, we model the node companies'profit functions in the CLSC and design the optimal compound incentive mechanism in terms of the principal-agent framework. Finally, we analysis the effect the laws and regulations would put on the profit f node companies by a CLSC network model. The main works this article has reached are as following:(1)The corporate strategy of Small-Medium Sized Logistics Enterprises (SMLEs) in Closed-loop supply chain from the perspective of SCM is studied. The article analyses the current state of SMLEs and concludes several characteristics: SMLEs are widely lack of core competence, and their service quality/level is relatively low, meanwhile, the relations of SMLEs to customers are instable. Besides, it defines the subordinate position of SMLEs, indicating the connecting function among the supplier, the producer and the consumer. On the basis of the analyses mentioned above, three strategic measures for the SMLEs to implement the SCM strategies are proposed: Enhance its core competence through programming its location in the SC systematically. Choose a proper strategic cooperative partnership to make a dynamic alliance based on the research of market orientation. In addition, associate suitable rivals to compete in the market according to analyses of the competition tendency.(2)The performances of the three modes are analyzed. Based on the interaction between the product promotion decisions in the forward channel and the collection activity in the reverse channel in a closed-loop supply chain, we model the node companies'profit functions in the CLSC and design the optimal compound incentive mechanism in terms of the principal-agent framework. After solving the optimal compounded contract, we highlight the impact of the buyback payment b in model R and Model TP on the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, the third part collection center as well as the total channel. It is observed that the agent, who is closer to the costumer (i.e., the retailer), is the most effective undertaker of product collection activity for the manufacturer. When b is set equal to its upper bound in R model, the double marginalization caused by profit allocation between the manufacturer and the retailer is eliminated and thereby the marketplace behavior of vertical integration is achieved in the reverse channel. Besides, We analysis the alternative marketing strategies of the manufacturer in terms of different price elasticity of demand and collection potentiality of different products as well as different stages of product life cycle in the CLSC with remanufacturing.(3)This article models the closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation by using variational inequality method. The network modeled consists of manufactures and consumer markets engaged in a Cournot pricing game with perfect information. Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium occurs when all players agree on volumes shipped and prices charged. The model presented is capable of exploring the effect of legislation on the volumes of product shipped and sale prices within the manufactures /consumer markets oligopoly and the profit of each company.Carrying out CLSC management is an effective approach of realizing circulation economy and the coordinated development of the economy and society. We hope the results of the article can provide certain reference to the government legislation and to the enterprise and also be helpful to the CLSC management to a certain extent in application in practice.