Economic Analysis Of The Transaction Of Government Official Positions

The transaction of government official positions has now become a common social phenomenon which tends to be even worse. Prices for different positions vary in different department and different places. Only giving the leadership some benefit can people get the expecting position. If not following the potential rule, they can't get the position. Buying parties are willing to give their own money to the leading parties, while the selling parties take the benefit for granted, even worse, in order to demand a bribe, some leaders put pressure on people who desirous of a position. The phenomena of transaction of government official positions are hated by the people and the state has taken many measures to severely punish it. But there are still large gaps between the result and what people expected. What's the reason? There must be objective laws playing in the role. Many scholars have studied corruption which is similar to the problem we discussed here. But using economics method to study the issue on transaction of government official positions is rarely seen. The paper has chosen this title is in the hope that economics method can be used to analyze the motives of transaction of government official positions, and to find out the law.This paper mainly uses the traditional new classical economics analysis method and posts transaction of government official positions into an"official positions market"for analysis, and analyzes the price formation of transaction of government official positions from the supply and demand aspect. Finally, by analyze the "official positions market" structure to achieve an equilibrium price of transaction of government official positions. According to this price, this paper analyzes the high social losses of it, and gives the corresponding preventive measures. Moreover, discussion of this issue integrates the use of incentive theory, game theory, and rent-seeking theory of modern economics analysis method and tries to incorporate these methods into the new classical framework to analyze the transactions of government official positions.This paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter I is an introduction, a brief account of the history and current situation of the transaction of government official positions. A literature review of it was made from the non-economic and economics points of view. In Chapter II we analyze the reasons for buying and selling official positions and the formation process, using rent-seeking and collusion theories. In Chapter III a simple cost-benefit analysis was used to analyze the buying parties'behavior. thus we obtain the reservation price of the buying parties; In Chapter IV, we still use a simple cost-benefit analysis to analyze the behavior of the selling parties, and obtain the minimum acceptable price of the selling parties .Finally we obtain the price range of transaction of government official positions, and then, reach the ultimate equilibrium price through analysis of the structure of the market of the transaction of government official positions. Chapter V analyzes the loss of the transaction to society, and obtains the relation between the loss to society and price of transaction of government official positions. Chapter VI gives a precaution against the transaction of government official positions, mainly using the price mechanism to expel the buying and selling parties from the"official positions market", thereby to eliminate the"official positions market".