| Food quality safety is a major benchmark of the economic development and people's living condition in a country. First, this paper summarizes the basic elements of food safety and proposes that China now mainly lies in the stage of food quality safety. Next, from the perspective of supply chain governance, it studies food quality safety issues and the governance, by the application of information economics, public goods, risk analysis, games theory, supply chain management etc. On one hand, it describes the basic situation of food quality safety market by the application of the adverse selection theory, discusses the external effect, and thus argues the necessary of government intervention. On the other hand, this paper sums up the current advanced international practice for food quality safety governance, including HACCP, IKB, RBI, traceability system.Based on these, its research route combines the market mechanism and the government intervention, which includes the quality risk propagation and its control, quality signalling in the food supply chain, composite incentive contract design of the retailer to its upper manufacturers, and other issues of governance. First, the mechanism that the quality risk propagation would enlarge from upstream to downstream in the supply chain is demonstrated. Through multiple static games, it proves the principle that food quality safety needs to be controlled from the source but the incentive mechanism should be driven from the circulation end. Next, it exams a Bertrand equilibrium in a food market where products have quality variances, in order to explains the phenomenon that food products with different qualities set up the same price. Therefore, it establishes dynamic game incomplete information, to research the quality signalling principle in a competitive market where food products have cost variances. After that,it drives the separating equilibrium which maximizes the social welfare, and the existing condition for separating equilibrium is concluded. Third, considering risks of the manufacturer to make effort to improve production quality, it proposes a concept of a compound incentive contract, to show how the retailer's procurement price based on a mandatory certification system influences the manufacturer's optimal effort, by establishing a Stackelberg game. Finally, the required conditions for the mechanism operation are deduced.Taking the current hot quality safety issue of Chinese food export trade into consideration, this paper offers a research under the framework of international trade. First, it clarifies the concept of periodical trade situation, and puts forward the view that technical standards and quality risks are necessary requirements for international trade and the concept of quality condition of trade is proposed. Second, it defines the quality condition of trade, using risk analysis and management and Bayesian statistics analysis, on the basic fact that small sample tests are implemented in agi-food trade normally. Third, through quality risk indifference curves, it establishes a trade model between two countries to describe the concept. Moreover, it argues a comprehensive analysis including both positive and negative impacts, when an import country raises its minimum quality standards. And to some extent, this measure may promote the quality situation of export countries. |
