| Nowadays, the competition of the market is becoming more and more intense and the demand of the customer is constantly changing. In this background, the modern management theory of Supply Chain Management (SCM), with its purposes to response the market quickly, satisfy the various demand of customer, increase the flexibility and reduce the cost, has obtained huge economic benefits in practice and has been accepted by both the global business circles and the academia. Actually, the system of SCM is the alliance of several interest-independent agents. Therefore, how to design a supply chain contract to coordinate the allocation of the interest in the system is being paid more and more attention.The traditional research of supply chain contract, which was mainly based on Operation Research, focuses on the obtainment of the optimal result, and has a hidden hypothesis that agents will come to that optimal result automatically. But due to the existence of asymmetry information among supply chain agents, it is necessary for people to consider how to provide incentive to have agents come to the optimal contract.By employing the theories and the technique of Information Economics, Game Theory, and Operation Research, and focusing on one basic type of contract—the Revenue Sharing Contract, this dissertation considers the below two coordination models under the asymmetry information: the first coordination model only considers the coordination with moral hazard problem, and the second coordination studies the coordination with both the moral hazard problem and adverse select problem. In those two models, this dissertation analyses the payoffs of the agents and the system within the uniform framework, when taking different risk preference combinations of agents into account, and obtains some meaningful conclusions, which enrich the research on the subject. |
