Research On Loaning Behavior & Incentive Mechanism Of China State-owned Commercial Bank

Commercial bank is rational and economy man, and the target of which is to obtain the profits. The commercial bank's loaning behavior is the reactions to the environments of the credit. Information asymmetry in commercial bank loaning is popular, and is one of the main reasons which result in commercial bank loaning risk. Incentive mechanism is the important measure to resolve the information dissymmetry problems, and which is the effective means to against the risk of loan. Information asymmetry exists in china state-owned commercial bank too. But, china state-owned commercial bank can't design and use incentive mechanisms successfully. The irrational loaning behaviors of china state-owned commercial bank and china state-owned enterprises destroy the incentive mechanism.The article includes two aspects. On the one hand, it is commercial bank' loaning behavior; on the other hand, it is incentive mechanism in commercial bank' loaning behavior. The theory of commercial bank' loaning behavior and incentive mechanism includes common theory of commercial bank' loaning behavior, the theory of designing incentive mechanism in commercial bank' loaning behavior, and the model of incentive mechanism in commercial bank' loaning behavior he fist part define the loaning behavior of commercial bank, describe the theory basis of designing incentive mechanism, and tell how to use incentive mechanism in loaning behavior through models. Some scholars in the West had established some math models to explain the relationship between the loaning behavior and incentive mechanism in commercial bank. But, they didn't take the situation of a China into account, besides the transition economy. Thus, those models must be ameliorated to adapt to analyze Chinese state-owned commercial bank' loaning behavior and incentive mechanism.First, it looks back the reform of enterprise and bank in China. It analyzes retrorse selection and moral risk in commercial bank' loaning behavior. Further, it analyzes the loaning behavior in financing game of enterprise and bank, in repaying loan game.Second, it analyzes the mechanism in the disabled incentive mechanism in the commercial bank's loaning behavior. It analyzes the reasons by putting a modified factorρinto the restriction condition of rational enterprise financing, by modifying the credit interest rate as a constant R, by putting an irrational factorηinto the restriction condition of rational warrantor, by putting an irrational credit factorσinto the restriction condition of bank.Third, it analyzes incentive mechanism invalidation and credit shrinking. Through the math model, it may analyze the reason to the separate equilibrium credit agreement can't be schemed out in the market of middle-small enterprise. The credit agreement can't reach the separate equilibrium because of lacking the incentive consistent restriction condition. Then, credit grudging behavior takes place in bank.Fourth, it analyzes incentive mechanism invalidation and credit concentration. The credit agreement has not differentiated risk type of advantage big enterprise in the market of advantage big enterprise credit market. Then, it can't debase the risk. The incentive mechanism is disabled, also.Finally, it analyzes the inside incentive mechanism invalidation in commercial bank and credit unbalance. The participation restriction condition and incentive restriction condition are both deficiency. The credit personnel can't be inspirited. The result is lacking enough filter of the credit object. This is the important reason to credit shrinking and credit concentration.