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Theoretical Study On Stagnance Of Transfer Of Domestic Industries Between Eastern And Western Region

Posted on:2008-03-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360215490305Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Recent years, with the widening gap between eastern and western domestic regional economy, the center government put forward the policy of overall planning development of the regional economics. The transfer of industry among districts can be a good method to achieve the aim. However, in fact, the transfer of industry within people's expectation did not emerge on a large scale. First, we studied the status quo of domestic transfer of industries among regions. According to the analyses, we knew that the transfer of industry between eastern and western was rather slow on the whole.And then, we tried to examine reasons of the slow transfer of domestic industries between the two regions theoretically from the perspective of microeconomics. Two theoretical models were established, one being the skilled-labor-transfer-model, the other enterprise-positional-model. According to the analyses of the first model, there will be ultimately over one half skilled labors gathering in one district. And when external situations remain steady, those skilled labors at the higher gradient district do not have the motive to transfer. According to the second model, when the synergy of production is provided, the two enterprises will finally choose to reside in one district This means the synergy of production can hinder the enterprise transfer between districts. In other words, under the influence of market mechanism, the higher gradient region, which obtains the externality along with the gathering, migh hinder the transfer of labors and enterprises between districts.In view of this fact, this thesis broached the factor of governmental influence over reginal economics to later study. Therefore, the governmental subsidy factor was included, not the government dominating over the operation of domestic economy. In this chapter, based on the idea of dynamic replication of revolutionary game, we established the model of cooperation between economic enterprises in unequal gradient districts. According to this revolutionary model, we proposed that the premise of cooperation was the potential gains of cooperation being great enough. Additionally, the western region should sacrifice certain profits so as to exchange market for technology. Furthermore, the local government should set up some successful examples that could bring about the demonstration effect and attract more eastern enterprises to cooperate with western enterprises.In the last part, with the theoretical analyses of the slow industry transfer and studies on the model of cooperation between two enterprises in unequal districts, this thesis made some policy recommendations to eastern and western governments respectively which might benefit the local economy in practice.
Keywords/Search Tags:Industry transfer, Regional economics, Inequality cooperation, Evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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