| Based on the high technology and scientific knowledge, venture capital, which plays a vital effect on the modern economic development, accelerates the transformation of scientific technologies into obvious productive forces, accordingly drives the entire economic development. While, the success of venture capital, on a large degree, lies on the success of principal-agency operations among the venture investor, venture capitalist and venture enterpriser. Because the information asymmetry situation exists between the venture investor and the venture capitalist, adverse selection and moral hazard occur during the venture capital operation procedure. Therefore, it holds the significant position during the procedure for how to effectively control the principal-agency venture and establish a rational incentive mechanism constraint.Based on the former research of various scholars, especially on the field of Principal-Agency Theory, this thesis first analyses theoretically, from the information economics' perspective, not only the general models in principal-agency operations, but also the relationship of adverse selection and moral hazard problems existing between the venture investor and venture capitalist.Secondly, the thesis carries on a deep research, qualitatively and quantitatively, on the necessity of Incentive Mechanism Constraint between venture investor and venture capitalist. Placing the adverse selection and moral hazard problems on the center, the optimal contract model of Incentive Mechanism Constraint is established through the studying of Principal-Agency Theory and Game Theory. Next, Incentive Compatibility Constraint and Participation Constraint are established through the comparison research on the information asymmetry and information dissymmetry, which maximizes the venture investor's effectiveness, consequently perfects the venture capital mechanism.Finally, this thesis analyses the venture capital frameworks in China and developed countries, and explains the limitations of venture capital industry in our country. At the end of the thesis, feasibility of limited partnership under our country's background is discussed and measurements for further perfecting our country's venture law are presented. |
