A Study On Transactions Incentive Problem For Taxation

In the "national redistribution" revenue guidance, our government often excessive emphasis on the supervision of taxpayers, and always suspected that taxpayers can not legitimately tax. This "oversight combat" incentive-based tax administration, not only caused the resentment of taxpayers, but also caused the government to ignore the cost for supervise, and led to high management costs low management inefficient.This paper is attempt to re-examine tax from the point of transaction, treat tax as a transaction between the government and taxpayers to exchange public goods and public services, the government might encourage taxpayers to submit their trading obligations. The paper firstly analysis the tax transaction process and put forward two main features, the asymmetric conduct and asymmetric information. Then on the analysis of these two main features, the paper put forward the relationship of principal-agent between government and taxpayers and the existence of agents, mainly the taxpayers' "moral hazard". Finally, use basic analytical framework to build a principal-agent tax transactions incentive models for the analysis of how the government to encourage taxpayers.Through the study of the tax incentive transactions, we can look at from the perspective of the tax transaction incentive management process. In the tax administration process, due to the acquisition of real tax information need to pay a high cost, the government can not be expected to monitor every taxpayer to tax legitimately, she must confess that taxpayers can use the information superiority for "information rent". Governments need to design a low-cost incentive contracts to reveal the true tax information, shared the two sides risk. In such transactions theory dominated tax management concept is compatible with the revenue service "- type management services" incentive.