The Contract Design Of Salesperson's Compensation Under Asymmetric Information

With the increasingly fierce market competition,salespersons are playing a more and more important role in the survival and development of a company.The core problem that company managers faced is how to stimulate salespersons' enthusiasm and arouse their potentials in order to promote the company's sales.An effective compensation con-tract could serve as a powerful tool for stimulating salespersons to work hard.This dis-sertation studies the contract design of the salesperson's compensation under asymmetric information.The main contents are as follows:Under dual asymmetric information,the contract of the salesperson's compensation that depends on their reservation utility is designed in this dissertation.The salesperson's compensation contract models under full information and private information of the mar-ket state are established,respectively.The influences of salesperson's market status in-formation and reservation utility type dependent on compensation contract are analyzed.The results demonstrate that the incentive coefficient of the compensation contract under full information is bigger than that under private information when the reservation utility type dependent parameter is high.The results also reveal that,under private information,only when the reservation utility type dependent parameter is comparatively high does incentive coefficient of the compensation contract increase significantly.Under bilateral moral hazard,the contract of the salesperson's compensation is s-tudied in this dissertation.Under the cases of full information and private information about the market state,the compensation contract models when the salesperson's effort is observable and unobservable are established,respectively.The values of the salesper-son's market status information and effort information are analyzed.The results show that when the salesperson's effort is unobservable,the salesperson's market status infor-mation has a positi've value only when the effort cost coefficient of the company is large;under private information,the salesperson's effort information has a positive value only when the volatility of the market uncertainty is small.Under two pricing strategies,the problem of salesperson's compensation contract design is explored.A two-tier principal-agent relationship—the principal-agent relation-ship between a company and a sales manager and that between the sales manager and a salesperson is considered.Under the strategy of company pricing strategy and the s-trategy of delegating pricing power to the sales manager,compensation contract models when the market state information is full and private are established,respectively.The corresponding optimal compensation contracts are obtained.The comparisons of the two pricing strategies under full information and private information are given.Under bilateral moral hazard,the compensation contract design problem of multi-salesperson with cooperation relationship is analyzed in this dissertation.As a bench-mark,the case that there is no cooperation between the two salespersons is discussed at first.In this case,the compensation contract models of personal performance evaluation and relative performance evaluation are established,respectively.When there is a coop-eration relationship between the two salespersons,a compensation contract model with team-incentive is established.The comparisons of compensation contracts under differ-ent working modes and different compensation evaluation forms are given by a numerical example.