Research On Incentive Reward Of The Professional Executive On Private Listing Firms

With more private companies going public, the governance structure exceed to be criterion, so the professional executive has become important in private listed companies. But under the asymmetric information of modern corporation system, cannot but lead the benefit of the professional executive and shareholder to differ, then come to agent problem. Thus for private listed companies, it is important to adopt professional executive reward incentive mechanism to reduce agent cost. In the paper we put forward the principal-agent problem of private listed company, establish the basic reward incentive model of the professional executive of private listed company, and do some research on the theoretic basis of the reward incentive fashions, distinguish the difference between the two incentive fashion in private listed firm. By an empirical analysis of the relation between professional executive incentive reward and performance of private listing companies, we can find out the problem of incentive reward mechanism for professional executive in private listing companies, moreover we provide some advice to improve the incentive effect of the reward.