| Central heating is the main form of survival security for residents during heating period in Chinese heating zone, particularly in"Three-North"areas. Also it is an important guarantee for urban environmental protection, economic development, social stability and the public welfare in the heating zone.During the past 15 years, central heating penetration's average annual growth rate is more than 13% in China. With the acceleration of urbanization process in China, the demand for central heating will be more urgent in heating zone.Currently market-oriented reform's difficulty is the scientific pricing of central heating in China,but also it's the key of reform of heating system.Based on both of Chinese situation and former research results, the paper strives to analyze double principal-agent relationship among stakeholders——government, heating enterprises and consumers in the pricing process of central heating from perspective of game theory,in order to creat pricing model of urban central heatingl under actual circumstances.Then the game model on central heating pricing of Harbin was established based on the principal-agent theory through empirical research based on 9 heating enterprises and many government branch of Harbin.To conclude,it seems obvious that government's subsidies are completely negative correlation with the price of central heating and proportional to the effort of heating corporation.In the end, based on all of above conclusion,the paper put forwards 3 types of countermeasures and proposals for maximizing social welfare:providing a kind of new countermeasure for government's regulation of price of heating; offering new incentive measures and reform proposals for the heating enterprises; presenting consumers with new advice of right-safeguarding. All of above can bring up a new train of thought to conduct pricing reform of urban central heating, should be helpful for reference and decision making on pricing of other natural monopoly industries as well. |
PDF Full Text Request